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For almost a decade and one-half the Chinese participation question
has challenged the United Nations.' In its coming session the General As-
sembly will doubtlessly once again grapple with the question, but past
debates do not promise rational solution.2  In brief summary, two claim-
ants seek, or are proffered by others, to participate as the "State of China"
in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Specialized Agen-
cies. The Government of the Republic of China (Nationalist China)
has held the seat since the founding of the United Nations. The People's
Republic of China (Communist China), however, commands resources of
considerable magnitude, and events of recent years have enhanced its
claim to participation.3
*We thank W. Michael Reisman both for critical suggestions and invaluable assist-
ance in the final preparation of this article.
'For histories of the question, see Appleton, The Eternal Triangle (1961), and
Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the
United Nations 131-166 (1963). See also the text below, at notes 16-47.
2Past "representation" resolutions have invariably forced a choice between (1)
seating the Communist Chinese and excluding the Nationalist Chinese, and (2) retaining
the Nationalist Chinese and excluding the Communist Chinese. Proposals for compromise
have been rare, and seldom formally put before the General Assembly. Delegates have,
nevertheless, suggested that a special study committee be created, that provisional ar-
rangements be worked out if the "representation" resolution is passed in principle,
that the interested parties hold negotiations, that the two claimants be seated in differ-
ent organs, and that the solution of the participation question be tied in with a
general political settlement. See, e.g., remarks of Colombia, U.N. General Assembly,
16th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting 952 (A/P.V. 1073) (1961); Sweden, ibid.,
Plenary Meeting 913 (A/P.V. 1070) (1961); Ireland, ibid., Plenary Meeting 974
(A/P.V. 1075) (1961); Sierra Leone, ibid., Plenary Meeting 998 (A/P.V. 1076)
(1961); Spain, ibid., Plenary Meeting 1009 (A/P.V. 1076) (1961).
Scholars have generally taken somewhat limited views of the problem. The sources
are collected in the bibliography of Appleton, note 1 above, at 274-275. See also
Boyer and Akra, "The United Nations and the Admission of Communist China,"
76 PoL Sci. Q. 332 (1961); Brohl, "Five Lectures on Asia and the United Nations,"
102 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 125, 194 (1961); Petrov, What China Policy?
Part II (1961); Schick, "The Question of China in the United Nations," 12 Int. and
Comp. Law Q. 1232 (1963); Singh, Termination of Membership in International Or-
ganizations (1958).
E.g., French recognition of the People's Republic of China (see Erasmus, "General
de Gaulle's Recognition of Peking," 18 China Quarterly 195 (1964) and the Com-
munist Chinese atomic tests (see Halperin, China and the Bomb (1965)).
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Any decision on the Chinese participation question will have extra-
ordinary value impacts. Immense power is at stake. A participation de-
cision will determine whether and how one quarter of the world's popu-
lation will share in world community processes of authority, and it will
affect the resource-base--material, institutional, and strategic-of inter-
national organizations. It will influence the range and type of decisions
which world organizations can make in implementing and clarifying the
common interest. A participation decision will allocate seats on the
Security Council, the General Assembly and the Specialized Agencies.
The Security Council seat is permanent, and the veto permits its occupant
to influence virtually all Council decisions bearing on international peace
and security.4 The General Assembly seat carries the rights to vote and
debate, the privilege to negotiate in the corridors of the United Nations,
and the prestige of U.N. membership. Membership itself promises par-
ticipation in the U.N. Secretariat, an organ of increasing importance.
Immense power is at stake even outside the institutions of the United
Nations. A permanent Security Council seat is a symbol of Great-Power
status, with trappings of legitimacy, authority and control over extensive
resources. A transfer of the seat, with its attendant symbols, could work
important changes in the world power configuration. Some Western
countries, and certainly many non-aligned countries, might revise their
economic, military and political alliances. Southeast Asian political lead-
ers would certainly face disturbing policy choices. Communist govern-
ments and parties may reorient themselves in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Power, further, is not the only value at stake. A transfer of China's
United Nations seats could affect the advancement of human rights, the
development of international law, the distribution of wealth by interna-
tional agencies, the allocation of capital between the developed and lesser-
developed countries, the evolution of labor standards, and the dissemina-
tion of knowledge bearing on health, meteorology, food production and
peaceful uses of atomic energy. The transfer would have impacts on the
United Nations space programs. It certainly would influence the rule-
promulgating activities of such Specialized Agencies as the International
Telecommunications Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization.
With the impacts of a decision on the participation question so per-
vasive, it is not surprising to find elaborate, complex, and sophisticated
legal justifications for preferring the delegations of either "China."
Three different schools dominate so-called "juridical" analysis of the
question. Although these schools make their arguments and state their
preferences in the familiar terms of "membership," "representation," and
"credentials," they do not give these terms the clear and simple factual
referents which clear communication demands. A "membership" school
4A Security Council member may also strikingly influence Council decisions on the
"(procedural" or "substantive" quality of a particular issue. See, generally, Gross,
"The Question of Laos and the Double Veto in the Security Council," 54 A.J.I.L.
118 (1960).
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would require the People's Republic of China to apply for "admission"
to the United Nations as a "new" state.5 A "credentials" school argues
that the United Nations need only approve the "credentials" submitted by
the Communist Chinese delegation. A "representation" school purports
to distinguish itself from both the "membership" and "credentials"
schools, and invokes general Charter norms and seemingly ad hoc proce-
dures.7
Each of the schools has fashioned its own elaborate supporting argu-
mentation. The "membership" school invokes Article 4 8 of the U.N.
Charter, which establishes procedural and substantive criteria for the
admission of a state to membership in the United Nations. Communist
China meets none of the substantive requirements of Article 4, the argu-
ment goes, because it neither "represents" the Chinese people, nor is
"peace-loving," nor is "willing and able to fulfill its international obliga-
tions." Almost in passing, the membership school notes that the proce-
dures of Article 4 permit a permanent member of the Security Council
(and thus certainly the United States) to veto an application for member-
ship.
The membership school also looks to Articles 5 9 and 6 10 of the Charter,
which, it argues, prevent United Nations organs from excluding the
Nationalist delegations. The ftrst article specifies criteria and procedures
for suspending a Mlember; the second, criteria and procedures for expelling
a Member. Neither article, it is claimed, is applicable to the Nationalist
5 Cf., e.g., the remarks of the delegate from Costa Rica, U.N. General Assembly,
17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting 630 (A/P.V. 1161) (1962), and the
speech of Mr. Cazet (Congo, Brazzaville) who believed it necessary for the Peking
Government to evince a desire for admission to membership in the United Nations,
and to comply with the Organization's rules. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 597 (A/P.V.
1161) (1962).
a The "Icredentials school" has for many years been headed by the Soviet Union.
'With the increasing deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, Albania has become a
principal advocate of Communist Chinese participation in the United Nations.
7 The United States, until 1961 a member of the "membership" school, has in past
years been an articulate spokesman of the "representation" school.
8 Article 4:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council.
9 Article 5:
A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has
been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights
and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by
the Security Council.
10 Article 6:
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles con-
tained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
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Delegation, because the Security Council has not taken "preventive or en-
forcement action" against Nationalist China, and Nationalist China has
not "persistently violated" the principles of the Charter. Again, the
membership school notes, the procedures established in both articles would
permit a permanent member of the Security Council (and thus the United
States) to veto attempts to suspend or expel the Nationalist Government.
It is argued, in refutation, that these articles are not applicable to the
case of Chinese participation; it would make no difference that the Na-
tionalist Delegations might depart the Organization, for they are simply
not the "lawful" representatives of China.
The "credentials" school looks to allegedly pertinent Rules of Proce-
dure, which establish mechanisms for approving the "credentials" of the
delegations of Members." The principal issue, as this school sees it in
a confusion of terms, is to decide which government "represents" China;
this decision, in turn, is made to rest on a "factual" appraisal of a
11 The relevant Rules of Procedure for the Assembly read as follows:
Rule 27. The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delega-
tion shall be submitted to the Secretary-General if possible not less than one week
before the date filxed for the opening of the session. The credentials shall be issued
either by the Head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rule 28. A Credentials Committee shall be appointed at the beginning of each ses-
sion. It shall consist of nine members, who shall be appointed by the General As-
sembly on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall elect its own officers.
It shall examine the credentials of representatives and report without delay.
Rule 29. Any representative to whose admission a Member has made objection shall
be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives, until the Cre-
dentials Committee has reported and the General Assembly has given its decision.
(Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. U.N. Doe. A/520/Rev. 7 (1964).)
The comparable rules for the Security Council follow:
Rule 18. Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings
of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a repre-
sentative on the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not
less than twenty-four hours before he takes his seat on the Security Council.
The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or Government con-
cerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Mlinister
of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on
the Security Council without submitting credentials.
Rule 14. Any member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council
and any State not a member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a
meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the repre-
sentative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative
shall be communicated to the Security Council not less than twenty-four hours before
the first meeting which he is invited to attend.
Rule 15. The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any
representatives appointed in accordance with Rule 14 shall be examined by the Secre-
tary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.
Rue 16. Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security
Council in accordance with Rule 15, such representative shall be seated provisionally
with the same rights as other representatives.
Rule 17. Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection
has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights
as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter. (Sohn,
Editor, Basic Documents of the United Nations 70 (1956).)
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claimant's effective control over territory and population. Since the
People's Republic controls mainland China, the argument continues, it is
enough that each U.N. organ approve the "credentials" of the Communist
Chinese delegation. This kind of decision, under the invoked Rules of
Procedure, is invariably made by majority vote.
The "representation" school, without clearly indicating the meaning
of the term, rests its arguments on two United Nations resolutions. The
first resolution requires "representation" decisions to be settled "in the
light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances
of each case"; 12 the second labels the Chinese participation question "im-
portant" for voting purposes,'3 i.e., a decision to seat the Communist Chi-
nese delegation requires a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.
In evaluating the Chinese Communist claim to participation, this school
12 General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) reads thus:
The General Assembly,
Considering that difficulties may arise regarding the representation of a Member
State in the United Nations and that there is a risk that confficting decisions may be
reached by its various organs,
Considering that it is in the interest of the proper functioning of the Organization
that there should be uniformity in the procedure applicable whenever more than one
authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the
United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United
Nations,
Considering that, in virtue of its composition, the General Assembly is the organ of
the United Nations in which consideration can best be given to the views of all Member
States in matters affecting the functioning of the Organization as a whole,
1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government
entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes
a subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in
the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each
case;
3. Recommends that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim
Committee concerning any such question should be taken into account in other organs
of the United Nations and in the Specialized Agencies . . .
is General Assembly Resolution 1668 (XVI) reads as follows:
The General Assembly,
Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning
the representation of a founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United
Nations,
Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly
by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its
inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rules of
procedure as an item of an important and urgent character,
Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 De-
cember 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government
entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes
the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in
the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each
case,
Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that
any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.
1966]
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looks to general standards of international behavior, and more often than
not, finds the Communist regime sadly lacking.14 Its criteria, however, cut
two ways, and delegations have, for example, voted to seat Communist
China in hopes of including it in disarmament negotiations.1 5
Thus do the various legal arguments array themselves in opposing pha-
lanxes. Each has blurred the distinction between fact and legal conse-
quence. Each has kept well concealed the policies basic to decision. Each
has failed systematically to investigate past trends, to apply the policies
communicated by past trends to the peculiar facts of the Chinese participa-
tion question, and to make creative recommendations for solving this
perplexing issue.
In this article we shall attempt to suggest at least a framework of in-
quiry for less confused thinking about the problem.10 At the outset, we
shall briefly review the history of the Chinese participation question, and
then sketch the factual context in which general participation questions
arise. Next, we shall articulate the more fundamental policies-univer-
sality and responsibility-which underlie all participation questions in
the United Nations, and the more specific policies which are peculiar to
each form of participation controversy. Third, we shall survey past
trends for each type of participation decision. Fourth, we shall apply
these past trends to the Chinese participation question. Finally, we shall
make recommendations for a negotiated settlement.1 ,
1&E.g., Ambassador Stevenson's argument before the 17th Assembly rested on three
propositions:
1. The government of the People's Republic of China does not represent the Chinese
people.
2. The Communist Chinese are both past and present aggressors.
3. The Communist Chinese have purposes antithetical to those of the United Nations,
e.g., they seek liberation of Taiwan by force. (U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess.,
Official Records, Plenary Meetings 552-554 (A/P.V. 1156) (1962).)
15 One notable example is India which, when "Ia raw and naked war, premeditated
in plan, (was) being committed by the Peoples Republic of China against (India),"
paid tribute to the principle of universality, mentioned the need to bring Communist
China into disarmament negotiations, and supported in 1962 a Soviet proposal which
would exclude the Nationalist Chinese and seat the Communist Chinese. U.N. General
Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting 597 (A/P.V. 1159) (1962).
16 It does not escape us that the problem with which we deal could be formulated
in much more comprehensive terms. The problem could be formulated as one of how
the organized general community can best deal with renegade states which challenge
its policies of minimum and optimum order, and effect the changes in the predispositions
of the 6ites in such states in a way necessary to bring them to responsible participation
in a common public order. The important question, we would emphasize, extends be-
yond that of whether Communist China "should" be seated in the United Nations to
that of what are the probable constitutive and public order consequences of choice,
whether of seating or denial of seat. The basic difficulties might not, further, be re-
solved by either choice. An inquiry designed to be more effective might include, in
addition to appraisal of strategies about granting or denying access to arenas of author-
ity, a comprehensive review of all the potential sanctioning devices available to the
general community.
17 It may be emphasized that the position we take is not incompatible with the many
demands recently expressed in the United States for a fundamental rethinking of
[Vol. 60
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE PARTICIPATION QUESTION
On October 1, 1949, more than twenty-eight years after the official found-
ing of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung proclaimed
the establishment of the Central People's Government of the People's Re-
public of China. Within approximately a month and a half, Mao's For-
eign Minister had cabled the President of the General Assembly to repudi-
ate the legal status of the delegate of the Government of the Republic of
China."' Slightly more than a month later the Soviet delegate to the
Security Council, Jacob Malik, initiated official debate on the Chinese
participation question. 19  Arguing before the Council, Malik proposed that
the Council decide not to recognize the credentials of the Nationalist
Chinese delegate, and to expel him from the United Nations. His draft
resolution was decisively defeated, 20 and, ostensibly to protest the decision,
Malik walked out of the Security Council-to begin a general boycott of
United Nations organs by the Soviet bloc.
This Security Council decision did not end United Nations activity on
the participation question that winter. Secretary General Lie feared
the dissolution of the United Nations, and the formation of a Communist
counterpart to it.21 Believing himself obligated to "seek a solution in the
best interests of the organization," 22 he actively sought to seat the Com-
munist Chinese.23 To this end 24 he requested that the Legal Department
attitudes toward Communist China. Our purpose is merely to outline, as comprehen-
sively and realistically as possible, the legal bases-the contemporary expectations about
the requirements of future decision-upon which any successful negotiations for a dif-
ferent future must depend.
For a broad spectrum of the more important recent demands for a new approach to
the problems of Chinese participation, see U. S. Policy with Respect to Mainland
China, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1966).
A measured response to some of these demands is offered by Secretary of State
Rusk in his statement before the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, the text of which may be found in The New York Times, April 17, 1966,
p. 34, cols. 1-8.
is U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Doe. A/1123 (Nov. 18, 1949).
'9 U.N. Security Council, 6th Year, Official Records, 458th Meeting (S/P.V. 458)
(1949).
20 U.N. Security Council, 6th Year, Official Records, 459th Meeting, S/1443 (1950);
three in favor (India, Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R.); six against (China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt,
France, United States); two abstaining (Norway, United Kingdom). U.N. Security
Council, 6th Year, Official Records, 461st Meeting 3 (S/P.V. 461) (1950).
21 See Lie, In the Cause of Peace 252-273 (1952).
22 id, at 261.
23 Secretary General Lie spoke with diplomats on both sides of the Iron Curtain,
urged the committed delegates to pressure those yet undecided, and even suggested to
the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow that the Communist Chinese send delegations to
UNESCO and WHO conferences of 1950, which the Nationalist Chinese were not plan-
ning to attend. Ibid. at 252-273.
24"Armed with this memorandum" Secretary General Lie "proceeded to discuss
(the Chinese participation question) with all the members of the Council." "On the
basis of the above, an immediate and practical conclusion was that France, Egypt,
Ecuador and Cuba-members of the Council who did not recognize the Communist
1966]
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of the United Nations Secretariat prepare a Memorandum on recognition
and representation. 2r The Memorandum initially analyzed issues of rec-
ognition and representation; but it went on to state purported criteria for
solving representation questions. It proceeded by derivation from Article
4 of the Charter, and concluded that a representation decision should focus
on whether "the new government exercises effective authority within the
territory of the State and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the popula-
tion.'' 2s
When the Communist Chinese intervened in the Korean conflict, the
Secretary General seemed to change his public position. After this event,
he thought that "permanent members just as much as new members are
bound by the stipulations of Article 4" 1' 2 -an article that requires an
applicant for membership to be "peace-loving" and "willing to carry out
(the) obligations (of the Charter)."
The Korean crisis, and a tarn as Council President, brought Malik back
to the United Nations, but only to declare, as President of the Security
Council, that the Nationalist Chinese Delegation did not represent China,
and therefore could not participate in Council meetings. 28 Although his
ruling was overturned, 29 he still persisted in raising the participation issue,
and attempted to tie it to the agenda item which dealt with the Korean
problem.2 0 In this attempt, too, he failed.8' The General Assembly prom-
ised, however, to be a more receptive forum. Two Communist Chinese
cables 22 had challenged the Nationalist Chinese Delegation even before
the Assembly opened, and at its first meeting the Assembly was confronted
regime in China-might vote for the representation of the Peking government in the
Security Council, while still withholding recognition. Five members of the Council
already recognized Peking... .2 Ibid. at 257. The memorandum, we note, distin-
guished sharply between recognition and representation, and concluded that a Member
state could legally vote to seat the delegation of a government which it did not recognize.
25Doc. S/1466, "Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation in the United Na-
tions," in U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Supp., 1950, at 18.
28 In its entirety the argument was as follows:
"Article 4 requires that an applicant for membership must be able and willing to
carry out the obligations of membership. The obligations of membership can be
carried out only by governments which in fact possess the power to do so. Where a
revolutionary government presents itself as representing a State, in rivalry to an
existing government, the question at issue should be which of these two governments
in fact is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of the State in
fulfillment of the obligations of membership. In essence, this means an inquiry as
to whether the new government exercises effective authority within the territory of
the State and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population.
"If so, it would seem to be appropriate for the United Nations organs, through
their collective action, to accord it the right to represent the State in the Organization,
even though individual Members of the Organization refuse, and may continue to refuse,
to accord it recognition. . . ." Ibid. at 22.
27 Lie, op. cit. note 21 above, at 274. 28 0f. 1950 U.N. Yearbook 425 (1951).
29 The vote was eight to three (India, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia).
30 Ibid. at 425.
31By a vote of five to five (China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, United States) with
one abstention (Egypt).
32 Doe. A/1364; of. 1950 U.N. Yearbook 428 (1951).
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with four draft resolutions. An Indian resolution 33 required the General
Assembly to decide that Communist China "should be entitled to represent
the Republic of China in the General Assembly," and to recommend that
the other organs of the United Nations adopt similar resolutions. Two
Soviet resolutions 34 sought to expel the Nationalist Chinese Delegations
from the General Assembly and its organs and to seat Communist Chinese
delegations in their places. A Canadian resolution.35 proposed to estab-
lish a special committee to study the participation problem. It was this
latter resolution (as amended) that was finally adopted,36 and on December
15, 1950, the Special Committee held its first meeting. A day later, how-
ever, the Committee voted to authorize its President to report to the
Assembly that the Committee was unable to make any recommendation on
the matter.3 7
That fall the A Hoc Political Committee debated the topic "Recogni-
tion by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State." 8s
Often confused, the argument revolved around two proposals. A Cuban
resolution, 9 alleged to be "subjective," recommended that representation
decisions focus on a claimant's "ability and willingness to achieve the
purposes of the Charter, to observe its principles and to fulfill the inter-
national obligations of the State" and the claimant's "respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms." A British draft,40 in claimed con-
trast, was supposedly "objective." It would seat, as the representative
of a Member, the delegation of a government which "exercises effective
control and authority over all or nearly all the national territory, and
has the obedience of the bulk of the population of that territory, in such
a way that this control, authority and obedience appear to be of a perma-
nent character. .... "
Debate was sharp but inconclusive, 41 and the question was sent to a sub-
committee for compromise. The subcommittee's recommendation eventu-
ally became General Assembly Resolution 396(V):
The General Assembly . . .
1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to
be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United
Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the
United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of
each case; . . .
3. Recommends that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly
or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be
•3 U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, Doe. A/1365 (1950).
341bd., Does. A/1369, A/1370 (1950). 35bid., Doe. A/1386 (1950).
30 Tbid., Plenary Meeting 16 (A/P.V. 277) (1950).
37 Ibid., Doe. A/1923 (1950).
38 Tbid., Ad Hoe Political Committee (Does. A/AC. 38/SR. 18-24, 57-60) (1950).
39 Tbid., 38th Meeting (Doe. A/AC. 38/L.6) (1950).
-Objd., 38th Meeting (Doe. A/AC. 38/L.21) (1950).
41 See the summary in Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 148-149.
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taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the
Specialized Agencies; . . .
At the opening of the Sixth General Assembly in 1951, the Soviet repre-
sentative renewed his demand that the question of Chinese participation
be included in the agenda.4 2 Opposing him, the Thai delegate offered
the first of the yearly postponement resolutions,4 3 which, in the form of
a General Committee Report, was adopted 37:11:4. From this year
through 1960, similar resolutions prevented debate on the merits of the
participation issue. Postponement, however, became a less effective
strategy as the majorities supporting these resolutions gradually dimin-
ished.44
To meet the Chinese participation question head on, in 1961 the United
States and the United Kingdom backed a New Zealand proposal 45 to place
the problem on the agenda; no longer was a discussion on the merits to
be postponed. The United States then joined with Australia, Colombia,
Italy and Japan to sponsor a five-Power draft46 which would declare the
issue of Chinese participation an "important question" within Article 18
of the U.N. Charter. A simple majority would be sufficient to pass this
proposal, and, if it were adopted, a two-thirds majority would be required
to pass a Soviet resolution-17 which would replace the Nationalist Delega-
tion with one from the People's Republic of China. Am overwhelming
majority 4 approved the five-Power draft and, by a larger margin than
the year before, the General Assembly rejected the Soviet draft resolution. 4
In subsequent years the Assembly has taken similar action, declaring the
Chinese participation question "important" under Article 18,0 and re-
jecting resolutions which would replace the Nationalist representatives
with a Communist Chinese delegation. 1
II. GENERAL PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS--THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
Participation questions grow out of an extraordinarily complex factual
context. A territorial community may change its internal policies, its
42 U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records (Doe. A/1941) (1951).
43 This was an oral proposal to the Assembly's General Committee. Cf. 1951 U.N.
Yearbook 265 (1952).
44Detailed statistics on U.N. voting on this question may be found in Halpern,
Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, Appendix B, pp. 503-507 (1965),
with charts indicating both aggregate annual votes as well as specific state behavior
through time.
45 U.N. General Assembly, 16th Sess., Official Records (Doe. A/4873) (1961).
4eIbid., Doe. A/L. 372. 147bid., Doe. A/L. 860; of. Doe. A/4874.
48 General Assembly Res. 1668 (XVI) was adopted by a vote of 61:34:7.
49 The vote was 48:36:20.
50 See, generally, Liang, "Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the
United Nations," 43 A...I.L. 288 (1949); idem, "Recognition by the United Nations
of the Representation of a Member State: Criteria and Procedure," 45 ibid. 689 (1951) ;
Bowett, The Law of International Institutions at 311-323 (1963); and Cohen, "The
Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice," 109 U. Pa. Law Rev. 1127 (1961).
5'For a statistical record, see Halpern, op. cit. note 44 above, at 508-508.
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external alliances, and its short-term and long-range objectives. It may
alter in its cultural orientation-its identification with a particular system
of values-and in its dedication to world public order. It may turn from
a search for optimum order to the subversion of minimum order. It may
increase or decrease its territory or population and change or completely
reorganize its resource base. It may abandon diplomatic strategies to
make more frequent use of the military instrument. As a participant in
the United Nations, it may recommend and execute policies totally different
from those of its predecessors and of varying compatibility under the
purposes of the organization.
The leadership of a territorial community may also change in varied
ways. A "new" government may mean "new" leaders with "new" de-
mands, expectations and objectives. Modes of governmental change range
from the persuasive techniques of free election to the coercive methods of
violent revolution; the period of change may be short-lived or it may
extend for decades as competing 6ites unsuccessfully struggle for power.
The outcomes of change may range along an exceedingly complex factual
continuum, from changes in the identity of leaders without change in
governmental policy, to major changes in the institutional structure and
policies of the territorial community.
As the leadership of a territorial community changes, so may its delega-
tions to international organizations. Here, change may be in the identity,
number, personality and identifications of individuals chosen to represent
a territorial community at the United Nations. The consequence may be
continuity in policy or a sharp turn in a Member's objectives and strate-
gies at the United Nations.
These changes-of territorial community, leadership, and U.N. delega-
tion--occur in varying degrees and innumerable combinations. Minor
changes in all relevant variables may leave a territorial community vir-
tually as it was before. Major changes may give birth to an essentially
"new" territorial community, i.e., a territorial community whose leader-
ship, governmental institutions, internal policies, external alignments, ob-
jectives, resources and strategies are largely different from its predeces-
sor's.52 For participation in the United Nations, as for other problems in
"state" and "governmental" succession, change and continuity in effective
control over people and resources are but some of many variables relevant
to policy and must take their significance for any particular problem
from the whole constellation of variables in a larger context.
Each of these changes-in territorial community, in internal leadership,
and in U.N. delegation-may indeed give rise to participation questions
52See, in this regard, O'Connell, "State Succession and Problems of Treaty Inter-
pretation," 58 A.J.I.L. 41 (1964); Young, "The State of Syria: Old or Newt"
56 A.J.T.. 482 (1962); O'Connell "Independence and Succession to Treaties," 38
Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 84 (1962). Compare with the highly flexible procedures in
GATT: Kunugi, "State Succession in the Framework of GATT," 59 A.J.I.L. 268
(1965). Comprehensive treatment of earlier trends may be found in O'Connell, The
Law of State Succession (1956).
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for the United Nations. To simplify analysis, we distinguish between
questions of "initial participation" and "subsequent participation."
Questions of "initial participation" occur in two situations. First, a
territorial community not previously in any way a participant in the
United Nations may seek inclusion in the Organization. Second, a terri-
torial community which has been regarded, in part or whole, as a Member
may have changed so as to become a "new" entity for U.N. membership
purposes. The "new" entity then may seek to participate as if it were
the "old" territorial community, and the Organization may be called upon
to decide on the "new" entity's rights to participation.
Questions of "subsequent participation" assume that a territorial com-
munity is a Member of the Organization, and that the territorial com-
munity has not changed so as to become a "new" entity for U.N. member-
ship purposes. We divide questions of "subsequent participation" into
two categories. "Representation questions" occur when competing gov-
ernments within a territorial community claim to represent the territorial
community at the United Nations. "Credentials questions" do not in-
volve competing governments, but occur when questions are raised about
the authority of delegations from a single government representing a
Member at the United Nations.
III. THE RFEAVAT POLcmIS
Universality and responsibility are the two more fundamental policies
that underlie all participation decisions in intergovernmental organiza-
tions. "Universal" participation"' assumes that each member of the
world community will have equal access to the organization, and that the
organization itself will help prospective members to full participation in
its structures of authority. It promises that the objectives of the organiza-
tion will parallel those of the world community, and that the policies of
the organization will reflect total political realities and rest on a broad
consensus. Each member of the organization will become more aware
of the demands, expectations, perspectives and identifications of the
other members, and this awareness itself will reduce social and cultural
barriers. The organization, it is assumed, would have access to the in-
stitutional structures of the entire world, and would acquire a resource-
base of considerable magnitude and variety. Members of the organization
would communicate with great ease, resort primarily to diplomatic strate-
gies, and, when required, apply sanctions with great flexibility. Wide
participation would minimize the opportunity for non-members to band
together to thwart the purposes of the organization. By marshaling a
greater resource-base, it would give the organization greater control over
dissident members of the world community. A "universal" organization,
it is further assumed, would be able to advance the production of all values,
and promote their equitable distribution to the entire world community.
58See, generally, Green, "Membership in the United Nations," 2 Current Legal
Problems 258 (1949); Higgins, note 1 above, at 55-57 (1963); Sehwarzenberger, The
League of Nations and World Order (1936).
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The principle of responsibility 54 is complementary to that of univer-
sality, and grants participation rights only to those who are capable and
willing to assume the responsibilities of membership. Irresponsible par-
ticipants in the world community, i.e., those whose perspectives and
operations are inimical to the purposes of the organization, are simply
denied membership. "Responsible" participation assumes that the mem-
bers of the organization-with similar demands and expectations-will
act quickly and effectively together to fulfill the objectives of the organiza-
tion. Similar perspectives and identifications will diminish mutual dis-
trust, enhance mutual tolerance, and reduce social and cultural barriers.
Members will presumably be willing to grant the organization access to
national institutions, and to entrust the organization with important re-
sources. With these resources, the organization-it is assumed-will be
able to apply extensive sanctions with great flexibility, even against non-
members. The organization, further, will be able to produce values for
each member of great magnitude and quality.
Policies unique to each type of participation question intertwine the
two basic principles of universality and responsibility. Universality and
responsibility will govern questions of "initial participation" when a
territorial community, not previously a Member, seeks inclusion in the
Organization. They are supplemented, however, by the principles of
stability and flexibility when a territorial community which has been re-
garded as a Member undergoes change so as to become a "new".entity
for membership purposes.
The principle of stability posits that the United Nations must have a
relatively fixed membership if it is to act effectively. Repeated question-
ing of a Member's qualifications, the principle argues, could impede the
speed with which the Organization responds to crises. The principle of
flexibility, on the other hand, would permit the Organization to appraise
changes in a Member. Changes in the constitutional structure of an en-
tity may affect its willingness and capability to perform the obligations
of membership; a lember may have changed so that its objectives and
actions are antithetical to the purposes and operations of the United
Nations. The principle of flexibility would require Members of the Or-
ganization to exclude such a territorial community from the United Na-
tions. Including it would violate the Members' expectations about the
constitution and operation of the Organization.
The principles of stability and flexibility link directly with the policies
of universality and responsibility. A territorial community which has
undergone minor changes could not seriously threaten the activities of
the General Assembly, the "universal" body of the United Nations. If, on
the other hand, it has become a "new" entity, and, in addition, rejected
prevailing standards of minimum order, the "new" entity might turn to
54 See, e.g., Higgins, note 1 above, at 56: ". . . a mechanical addition of members
does not always add to the strength of the association; differing ideologies within one
family may accentuate mistrust, and frequent conflicts within an organization may
weaken or paralyse its functions."
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diplomatic and procedural devices to delay and disrupt the workings of
the Organization. At this point the principle of flexibility joins with
the policy of responsibility: both demand that the Assembly alter the
participation rights of this "new" territorial community.
The same four policies, but in different degree and combination, govern
participation of a "new" entity in the Security Council, an organ of lim-
ited membership and responsible functions. So small in size is the Council,
and so great in potential impact are its decisions, that minor changes in
a territorial community may affect its functioning. A territorial com-
munity that has undergone major changes, rejecting principles of mini-
mum order, could seriously threaten the operations of the Council. In-
cluding it on the Council may violate the expectations of both the Council
members and the other participants in the world community.
Quite different policies govern questions of "subsequent participation."
Four policies peculiar to representation cases interlace the more general
principles of universality and responsibility. The first assumes that a
representation decision should not prejudicially affect the outcome of civil
conflict, and would postpone a decision "approving" one of the claimants.
The second policy equates incipient or actual revolution with a breach of
order in the world community. It would favor the claim of the older
and established government against the revolutionaries. A third policy
would prevent a "watering down" of "membership rights" in the United
Nations, and would prohibit a multiplication of a "Member's" "repre-
sentatives." It would grant participation to only one government, namely,
the government that would best fulfill the purposes of the Organization
and that would best represent the inclusive and exclusive interests of
the Member. The fourth policy would permit this multiplication and
grant access to the representatives of both the established and the revolu-
tionary government. Its purpose would be to insure a voice in community
processes of decision to each individual living under the adversary govern-
ments.
Only one policy governs "credentials" questions. It would look to the
validity of the documents presented by claimant delegations, and would
award the claimed seat to the delegation which represents, and was in fact
appointed by, the government of a Member.
These policies are at the heart of all participation decisions in the United
Nations. As commonly stated, their terms are abstract and complemen-
tary, furnishing but the barest guidelines for decision. To give them
operational meaning for purposes of choice, we must ground them in the
facts of community change and the decision processes of the United
Nations.
IV. PAST TENDS IN THE APPLICATIoN oF PoLicisE
The two more general policies-universality and responsibility-find
substance in both the constitutional framework and the practice of the
United Nations. Participation questions have not dealt solely with "in-
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eluding" or "excluding" entities in the United Nations; the principles
of universality and responsibility have affected the structure of the United
Nations," the voting rights of Members, 8 the staffing of the Secretariat,"r
and the apportionment of assessments. s The General Assembly, thus, is
the "universal" organ of the United Nations. Yet to qualify for mem-
bership, an applicant must be willing and able to carry out Charter obli-
gations; 3 and to remain a Member with full rights of participation, a
Member must neither persistently violate Charter principles nor so act
as to cause the Security Council to take preventive or enforcement action
against it00 These last requirements clearly allude to the principle of
"responsibility." Conversely, the Security Council, whose decisions under
Chapter VI 11 of the Charter have major impacts on international peace
and security, is supposedly the more "responsible" organ of the United
Nations. Its membership is limited, and certain of its members can cast
decisive votes on particular issues.6 2  The two principles, however, find
their most important meaning in the two types of specific participation
questions we have indicated above.
A. QUESTIONS OF INITIAL PARTICIPATION
1. "Non-Menber" Territorial Communities
United Nations decision-makers have invoked a great variety of criteria
and procedures to solve questions of initial participation. When terri-
torial communities, not previously Members of the United Nations, have
sought participation in the Organization, these decision-makers have turned
principally to the "membership" provisions of the United Nations Charter;
yet they have also creatively revised membership procedures and criteria,
and on occasion they have invented criteria and procedures unknown to
the Charter-framers. The history of these criteria and procedures is a
study in the competing policies of universality and responsibility.
(a) The Charter Provisions.-Delegates to the Dumbarton Oaks and
San Francisco Conferences sought to create a "universal" world organiza-
tion, but one whose Members had demonstrated and would assume a mini-
mal degree of international responsibility. 3 The Dumbarton Oaks Pro-
posals measured responsibility by requiring that an applicant to member-
ship be "peace-loving." 64 Amendments to the Proposals suggested more
comprehensive analysis of an applicant's internal policies and external
55 See, generally, McDougal, Lasswel and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 910-
923 (1963).
56 Tbid. at 923-929. 7 Ibid. at 929-934.
58 Ibid at 943-953. 55 U.N. Charter, Art. 4.
60 Ibid., Arts. 5, 6. 61 Ibid., Arts. 33-51.
62 Ibid., Art. 27.
63 See, generally, Goodrich and Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations 6-9,
112-139 (1949); Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter 349-
362, 843-851 (1958).
64 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International
Organization, Chap. 3; 39 A.J.I.L. Supp. 47 (1945).
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ties,6 5 but the Charter framers decided on only five criteria for subsequent
membership in the United Nations: 6 an applicant had to (1) be a state,
(2) be peace-loving, (3) accept the obligations of the Charter, (4) be able
to carry out these obligations, and (5) be willing to do so. The framers
noted, however, "that in passing upon the admission of a new member,
considerations of all kinds (can) be brought into account." 07
(b) The Provisions in Practice.-In the Organization's first decade
and a half, considerations of all kinds have in fact been brought into
account.6 8 Even in the early years, when Article 4 analyses were most
juristic, the stated qualifications for admission proved so abstract and so
broadly phrased that virtually all the characteristics of a prospective
Member were examined. 9 The requirement that an applicant be a "state"
expanded to permit inquiry into the size of its territory and the definite-
ness of its borders, the stability and effectiveness of its government, and
its independence. To determine whether an applicant was "peace-loving,"
delegates looked to its conduct during World War II, and to its willingness
to use peaceful methods to settle postwar disputes. They examined the
degree of coercion an applicant employed in hostilities with its neighbors,
in border incidents, and in interferences with shipping. Evidence of an
applicant's ability to carry out its international obligations touched on
diverse factors. In the United Nations' first year, the Committee on
New Members thought it appropriate to investigate the composition of
Jordan's and Outer Mongolia's budget; 70 it further asked Outer Mon-
golia for "detailed information regarding . .. (t)he Constitution of the
Mongolian People's Republic and other pertinent facts relating to its
system of government." An applicant's defense arrangements, its con-
65 Proposed qualifications for membership included the following:
(1) the applicant's political institutions must insure that the state is a servant of
its citizens.
(2) the applicant must observe the principle of pacta sunt servanda or the doctrine
of the inviolability of obligations. Doe. No. 202 1-2-9, 7 U.N. Conf. Int. Org.
Does. 18 (1945), henceforth cited as "UNCIO."
(3) the applicant must not be a neutral. Ibid. at 19.
(4) the applicant must "love . . .the democratic system." 7 UNCIO 284 (1945).
(5) the applicant must repudiate the use of force. 3 UNCIO 557-558 (1945).
(6) the applicant must respect human rights. 1 UNCIO 304 (1945).
(7) the applicant must be freedom-loving. Ibid.
66 U.N. Charter, Art. 4.
67 Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1/2 on Chapter III (Membership), 7
UNCIO 324, 326 (1945). This phrase was omitted from the report of the IRapportour
of Committee I. Cf. 6 ibid. 248 (1945).
68 Some description and citation of factors deemed relevant for admission may be
found in the text and footnotes at notes 63, 69-77. For general treatment, see Cohen,
Zoo. cit., and Liang, Zoo. cit., note 50 above.
69 These characteristics are exhaustively surveyed in Cohen, Zoo. cit. note 50 above, and
in Prudente, Admission to the United Nations as a Diplomatic Instrument (June, 1959)
(unpublished thesis in U.N. Library and Univ. of Southern Calif. Library).
70 Telegram from the Acting Secretary General, in U.N. Security Council, Official
Records, Supp. No. 4, at 123-124 (1946); Letter from the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on the Admission of New Members ... , ibid. at 143.
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stitutional authority to conduct foreign policy, and its dependency on
foreign Powers have all been objects of scrutiny. In more recent years,
it has been important that an applicant had a democratic constitution,'7 1
was devoted to goals of human dignity,72 and possessed sufficient economic,
intellectual, social and political resources.78  Delegates have turned to
equally varied sources to prove an applicant's willingness to carry out its
international obligations. The history of an applicant's transition to
statehood,' 4 particularly if a ward of the United Nations7 5 its membership
in international organizations,'7  the extent of its diplomatic relations,' 77
the degree to which it has been recognized and accepted into the inter-
national community,78 and its adherence to the principle pacta sunt ser-
71 Telegram from the Acting Secretary General. Ibid. at 124.
72 At both San Francisco (7 UNCIO 326) and Potsdam (13 Dept. of State Bulletin
159 (1945)), it was stated that states whose regimes had been established by the
Axis were ineligible for membership. In the first three years of activity, nine of the
eleven applicants who were rejected had either been under the control of, associated
with or neutral to the Axis Powers during the war. Among the numerous examples
of subsequent practice, see the remarks of Barnes of Liberia regarding Tanganyika's
"Ideep consciousness of the importance of civil liberties and political rights": Security
Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 3 (1961); of Berard of France,
ibid. at 6; of Stevenson of the United States, ibid. at 8-9. See remarks of Loutfi
of the United Arab Republic on Kuwait: Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records,
984th Meeting, at 2-3 (1961).
73 See remarks of Sir Patrick Dean in regard to Tanganyika, Security Council, 16th
Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 2 (1961; of Barnes of Liberia, ibid. at 3-4;
of Malasekera of Ceylon, ibid. at 4; of Berard of France, ibid. at 6; but see remarks
of Zorin, ibid. at 12-13. See remarks of Loutfi of U.A.R. on Kuwait, ibid., 984th Meet-
ing, at 2-3 (1961).
74This factor was of particular concern in the Mongolian application: see Security
Council, 1st Year, Official Records, Supp. No. 4, at 65, for Russian contention that Mon-
golian independence was a result of a democratic plebiscite, and Security Council, 2nd
Year, Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 13, for "the Committee on Admissions"
negative conclusion. In the case of the Jordanian application, Poland contended that
unilateral action by the United Kingdom (the former Mandatory) was an inadequate
mode of establishing independence: ibid., Supp. No. 4, at 70. For an analysis of the
modality of transition to statehood as a factor in admission, see Higgins, op. cit. note
1 above, at 27-31.
75 See remarks of Sir Patrick Dean regarding Tanganyika, Zoc. cit. note 73 above, at
1-2.
76 Thus, the representative of Ceylon noted, in the debate on Tanganyika's member-
ship, that the applicant was a member of the Commonwealth. U.N. Security Council,
16th Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 4 (1961).
In the debate on Kuwait's application, the U.A.R. noted that the applicant was a
member of the Arab League, IMCO, UPU, ITU, ICAO, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, OPEC
and the ILO, and that such participation indicated its recognition as a state. U.N.
Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 984th Meeting, at 3 (1961).
77 In 1946 the U.S.S.R. opposed the applications of Ireland, Portugal and Trans-
Jordan, inter alia, because of the absence of diplomatic relations between the applicants
and Russia. Security Council, 2nd Year, Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 15. In
the debate on Kuwait's application, the United Arab Republic noted that sixty-two
states in Europe, Asia and Africa had recognized the applicant. Security Council, 16th
Year, Official Records, 984th Meeting, at 3 (1961).
78 Thus M. Berard of France in regard to Tanganyika's application noted that the
application had been approved by the former mandatory government. Security Coun-
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vanda,79 have all been thought factors testifying to an applicant's adher-
ence to Charter principles.
However admirable this multifactoral analysis, inconsistency has marred
the actual application of Article 4. The eleven-member Security Council
has denied membership to applicants thought qualified by the General
Assembly. 0 It has excluded candidates in one year, only to recommend
them in subsequent years, but without any apparent change in the appli-
cant's ability to qualify under Article 4.81 Procedural abuses,82 incon-
sistent application of membership criteria,88 pointed disregard of Article
4 84--all mar U.N. "membership" practice.
cil, 16th Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 6 (1961); the U.A.R. in the debate
on Kuwait noted that the applicant had been recognized by 62 states, the majority
of the community. Ibid. 984th Meeting, at 3 (1961).
79 The community's concern in application procedures with colorable compliance with
the basic norms of international law is nowhere better demonstrated than in the rejection
in 1947 of Albania's application. The Committee on Admission of New Members con-
sidered it significant, if not decisive, that Albania bad refused to reaffirm prewar bi-
lateral treaties, had conducted itself inappropriately in the Corfu Channel case, had
not paid proper respect to the Security Council's recommendation and had not co-
operated with the organization in the Greek case. Of. Security Council, 2nd Year,
Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 3-8 (1947).
8 E.g., General Assembly Resolutions 35 (I); 113 (II); 197 (1M1); 296 (IV);
450 (VI); 620 (VII).
81.g., Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jordan, Libya,
Nepal, Outer Mongolia, Portugal and Rumania were non-Members in 1954 and Members
in 1955.
82 When Nepal applied for membership in the United Nations, the Security Council
routed its application to the Committee on New Members. Initially the Soviet Union
moved that the question of Nepalese admission be postponed for lack of information.
In response, the delegates suggested either that Nepalese be brought before the
Committee for questioning or that specific questions be asked of the Katmandu gov-
ernment. The Soviet delegate objected to this proposal, presumably because he thought
information might be forthcoming even if the question of Nepalese admission were
postponed.
Delegates then proposed a resolution that provided for special machinery to gather
the information requested by the Soviet delegate. The Soviet Union, however, objected
to this resolution. It also faulted an Argentine compromise amendment that would
have postponed the consideration of the Nepalese application for two weeks to "enable
the government of Nepal to submit the (necessary) information." The amendment
allegedly would have impaired Nepalese sovereignty. Eventually the Chairman of the
Committee wrote the Nepalese authorities for more specific information. When re-
ceived, the data was distributed to the delegates on Aug. 10. The Committee met again
on Aug. 16; yet the Ukrainian delegate still thought he needed additional time to study
the documents. The committee postponed decision for one week, and when it met
again the delegate from the Soviet Union had this to say:
"(The delegation of the USSR) while not opposed to acceptance of the application
of Nepal, would not vote for it, as it would be unfair to accept Nepal while the
applications of a number of other governments had been systematically rejected.II U.N.
Security Council, 4th Year, Official Records, Committee on New Members, Meetings
31-34 (Doe. S/C.2/SR. 34 at 2) (1949).
(The summary above is based on Meetings 31-34 of the Committee on New Members.)
88 In 1946 the Soviet Union vetoed the application of Portugal and Ireland without
mentioning their wartime affiliations. That same year the Soviet Union voted for the
admission of Siam, which had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with
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There has been a pattern, however, to voting on membership applications,
and it is this pattern that has been crucial in determining the "weights"
particular criteria have had in the membership process. In the early
years of the Organization, when the Cold War was at its height, only
"neutral" candidates were certain of admission to the United Nations.
"Pro-Western" applicants invariably met a Soviet veto: "pro-Com-
munist" applicants lost to a primarily "Western" voting majority.8 5
With the Cold-War thaw in the mid-fifties, both camps in the bi-polar
world relaxed their standards for determining the "neutrality" of par-
ticular candidates, 8  and traded applications one against the other.8 7
"Neutral" candidates, by definition, were "willing to carry out (their
Charter) obligations" to all the blocs in the world community. "Com-
mitted" applicants, again by definition, were "willing to carry out (their
Charter) obligations to only one (or two) of the camps in our bi- (or tri-)
polar world." For admission to membership, "neutral" candidates had
only to possess certain physical characteristics, namely, a sizeable territory
and population and a Foreign Office.88 For "committed" applicants (with
Japan and then had declared war on Great Britain and the United States. In 1947
the Soviet Union charged that Ireland and Portugal had been sympathetic to the Fascist
Powers, and had not offered justification for their wartime behavior. It again vetoed
the two applications.
In 1946 the Soviet Union vetoed the applications of Ireland and Portugal and Jordan
on the sole ground that these nations had not established "diplomatic relations" with
the Soviet Union. That same year the Soviet Union voted for the admission of Siam,
though it is not at all clear that that nation had recognized the Soviet Union or had
exchanged diplomatic representatives with it at that time. See, generally, U.N. Security
Council, Official Records, 55th-58th Meetings (Does. S/P.V. 55-58) (1946); ibid., 186th,
190th Meetings (Does. S/P.V. 186, 190) (1947).
84E.g., in 1946 the Soviet Union vetoed three membership applications on grounds
that the applicants did not have "diplomatic relations" with a permanent Member of
the United Nations, although this is not a criterion mentioned in Art. 4. More im-
portantly, the Soviet Union did not take the trouble to relate the absence of diplomatic
relations to a state's ability or willingness to carry out its international obligations.
85 "In fact, of course, though founder members (particularly permanent members
of the Security Council) have invoked each set of (membership) arguments, without
much regard to consistency, they have generally been guided in their voting by a
cruder set of considerations-namely whether a given applicant, if admitted to mem-
bership, would strengthen their 'side' in the United Nations or not. In general, as
might be guessed, this has meant that the West has supported new admissions and the
Communist bloc has been suspicious of them. It has also meant in fact and contrary
to the clear intentions of the Charter, that applications have seldom been considered
on individual merits but rather as a part of a general bargain, like the celebrated
'package deal' in 1955." Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution 73
(1959). Mr. Nicholas' conclusions are documented in Goodman, Some Thoughts on
Chinese Representation in the United Nations 20-44 (1962) (unpublished divisional
paper on file at the Yale University Law Library).
50In 1956 the Soviet Union supported Japan's application for admission, and both
the United States and the Soviet Union have voted favorably on the applications of
the non-committed countries.
87 E.g., the deal involving Outer Mongolia and Mauritania in 1961.
SaRosalyn Higgins makes a different case. See Higgins, note 1 above, at 11-57,
and her earlier article; Cohen, note 50 above.
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the same characteristics) it was necessary first to find counterparts for
them in another of the world camps, and second, to strike a deal for
their admission.
United Nations procedures, as conceived in the early years, later tended
to give way to insistent demands for "universality." Prior to 1955 the
Security Council and the General Assembly voted on separate and single
vetoable membership applications."" That year the delegates created a new
and flexible procedure-the package deal-which one representative has
described thus:
. . . the draft resolution (recommending fifteen applications) was
proposed on the basis of an understanding that there be an over-all
or en bloc admission; that is to say, it seeks a solution as a result of
prior negotiations rather than on the basis of the application of well-
known principles.9 0
Since 1955, delegates have held these "prior negotiations" even outside the
Security Council, and they have traded Assembly votes on one participa-
tion question for Council votes on another."
Other techniques have also eroded the apparent formalities of Article 4;
on occasion the United Nations has processed "membership" applications
with but the slightest concern for procedural technicality. In 1947 Pakis-
89 Note that in 1946 the U. S. proposed that a group of applicants be admitted in
a "package deal." The Soviet Union, however, thought each candidate should be
considered on its merits. Compare the following quote from the opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the "Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership
in the United Nations":
"IThe second part of the question concerns a demand on the part of a Member making
its consent to the admission of an applicant dependent on the admission of other
applicants.
"Judged on the basis of the rule which the Court adopts in its interpretation of
Article 4, such a demand clearly constitutes a new condition, since it is entirely un-
connected with those prescribed in Article 4. It is also in an entirely different category
from those conditions, since it makes admission dependent, not on the conditions re-
quired of applicants, qualifications which are supposed to be fulfilled, but on an ex-
traneous consideration concerning States other than the applicant State.
"The provisions of Article 4 necessarily imply that every application for admission
should be examined and voted on separately and on its own merits; otherwise it would
be impossible to determine whether a particular applicant fulfils the necessary condi-
tions. To subject an affirmative vote for the admission of an applicant State to the
condition that other States be admitted with that State would prevent Members from
exercising their judgment in each case with complete liberty, within the scope of the
prescribed conditions. Such a demand is incompatible with the letter and spirit of
Article 4 of the Charter." [1948] I.C.J. Rep. at 64-65.
90 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Plenary
Meeting 3 (Doe. A/AC.80/P.V.31).
91 In 1961 a package deal set Mauritania (and the votes of the West African states
against Nationalist China on the participation issue) against Outer Mongolia (and
the Nationalist Chinese veto on the Mongolian membership application). If the
Nationalist Chinese rejected the Outer Mongolian membership application, the Soviet
Union would veto Mauritania's application and this would trigger the West African
vote to swing against retaining Nationalist China in the United Nations. Mauritania
was admitted.
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tan split from India (a Mlember of the United Nations), 92 and sought
participation in the Organization. 3 After modest controversy, its mem-
bership application was routed through the United Nations on the basis
of a Secretariat memorandum, 94 which held Article 4 procedures and cri-
teria applicable because Pakistan was a "new" state.9 5 Pakistani mem-
bership, however, was a "fait accompli." 96 Pakistan's application was
handled with unusual speed and without significant objection-more on
the basis of informal consensus than strict procedures.9 7
Article 4, moreover, has not been the only route to U.N. participation for
territorial communities that were not Members of the Organization. In
1958 the U.A.R. sought participation after the merger of Egypt and
Syria; in 1961 Syria sought participation after the dissolution of the
U.A.R.9 s Neither claimant, when seeking participation, was then, in its
form as claimant, a Member of the United Nations. In both cases, U.N.
decision-makers included the claimants within the Organization, but by
remarkably informal and ad hoc procedures, and without attempting to
articulate criteria for decision. In 1961, for example, the President of
920 f. The Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order of 1947, U.N.
Doe. A/C.6/161.
93See generally Higgins, note 1 above, at 321-322; Laing, "Admission of Indian
States to the United Nations," 43 A.J.I.L. 144 (1949); and Schachter, "The Develop-
ment of International Law Through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secre-
tariat," 25 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 91, 101-109 (1949).
94 U.N. Press Release PM/473.
95 " In the view of Dr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs,
the problem was analogous, from the viewpoint of international law, to the situation
which arises when part of an existing state breaks away and becomes a new state.
According to that theory there would be no change in the international status of
India which continued as a state with all treaty rights and obligations as well as the
rights and obligations in the United Nations. Therefore, following that theory of
state succession, Pakistan would be regarded as having broken off and become a new
state and, as a new non-Member state, must seek admission to the United Nations pur-
suant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter. . . . While this legal opinion was
only intended for the guidance of the Secretariat, its ultimate effect was to plot the
course which the Security Council and the General Assembly subsequently followed."
Laing, Zoo. cit. note 93 above, at 146.
OtLaing, Zoo. cit.
97 "Some support for (the contention that Pakistan should be admitted automati-
cally) was to be found among other delegations but it was not pushed with . . . vigor,
the feeling being that the question of membership in this case was of the order of a
fait accompli and that it was more important to set up principles applicable in future
cases. . . . Throughout the controversy, there was never any question as to the desir-
ability of India and Pakistan as Members .... Following established procedure, (Pak-
istan's) membership having been favorably reported upon by the Security Council, it
was referred to the First Committee and reported by that Committee to the General
Assembly. In the subsequent balloting the admission of Pakistan was approved by
a vote of fifty-three to one. The negative vote was cast by Afghanistan, with which
Pakistan was having some border disagreement. However, in accordance with later
instructions received from his government, the Afghanistan delegate withdrew his
negative vote and the admission of Pakistan was unanimous." Laing, loc. cit. note 93
above, at 146-148.
9 See Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, Supp. at 59-60 (Does. S/4957
and S/4958).
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the General Assembly spoke privately to its Members, and found no ob-
jection to the seating of Syria. In a morning session of the Assembly
he proposed that Syria be seated that afternoon, but only if there were
no protests.99 There were none, and Syria that day assumed full partici-
pation in the United Nations.10
2. "New" Territorial Communities that Claim to be "Members"
The United Nations Charter provides for neither systematic nor con-
tinuous appraisal of fundamental changes in the composition of the terri-
torial communities that are Members of the United Nations.101  At best,
Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter specify procedures and criteria for sus-
pending and expelling Members.1 0 2  The vote under these articles is veto-
able, however, and decisions occur when a territorial community already
is acting as a participant in the Organization, rather than when it claims
participation. Perhaps to circumvent these obstacles both the General
Assembly and the Security Council have created informal methods for
appraising change in a Member territorial community.
(a) The General Assembly.-The Credentials Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly has been primarily responsible for appraising change in
a Member.103  It has generally ignored drastic changes in a Member's
external alignments, even when a revolution meant that a United Nations
Member would switch allegiances in the bi-polar world. Hungary is the
one important exception. 10 4 In 1956 and for several years thereafter the
99 U.N. Doe. A/4914, cited in Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 324.
100 Syria could have been classified-under state and governmental succession doc-
trine--as a "new" state, much as Pakistan was, and could have been forced through
the formalities of Art. 4 procedures. In both the Syrian and Pakistani cases, the
claimants' responsibility was unquestioned, and formal procedures were sacriflced for
"universality" in the Organization.
101 Of. Charter of the Organization of American States, Art. 3. Delegates to the San
Francisco Conference virtually overlooked the consequences for the Organization of
division within a Member body politic. See, generally, 3 UNCIO at, e.g., 31-32, 60-61,
454-455, etc., and 7 ibid. at 11-12, 18-19, 24-25 and 34.
Delegates were more concerned with Chap. VI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,
which designated by name the permanent members of the Security Council. Mexico,
for example, proposed that the permanent seats on the Council be called "semi-
permanent" and that the Assembly review at the end of 8-year periods the allocation of
seats in this category. 11 UINCIO 289.
102 McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, note 55 above, at 908-910; Sohn, "Expulsion or
Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization," 77 Harvard Law Rev. 1381
(1964).
1-3 See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Credentials Committee Reports, as
follows: 6th Sess. (A/1983); 7th Seas. (A/2234); 8th Sess. (A/2490) (A/2593);
9th Sess. (A/2752) (A/2880); 10th Seas. (A/3027) (A/3091); 11th Seas. (A/3536);
12th Seas. (A/3773); 13th Sess. (A/4074); 14th Seas. (A/4346); 15th Seas. (A/4578)
(A/4743); 16th Seas. (A/5055); 17th Seas. (A/5395); 18th Seas. (A/5676/Rev. 1).
104 Note that in the Credentials Committee meetings for the 18th Session, Algeria,
the U.S.S.R., and Liberia thought "the time had come for the U.N. to undertake a
review of the validity of the credentials submitted by (South Africa)." The South
African Government, in .their view, was not "representative of the people of South
Africa and ... persistently violated the principles of the U.N. Charter and continued
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Credentials Committee of the General Assembly refused to pass on the
credentials of the Hungarian Delegation, purportedly because Hungary
had not obeyed certain Assembly resolutions.1 5
(b) The Secitrity Couvel.-Except for the 1958 Iraqi revolution, the
Security Council has not addressed itself to participation questions re-
lating to change in the body politic of a Member. Not one of the major
post-World-War-II revolutions has occurred in a body politic when it
was a non-permanent member of the Security Council. The Council has
never had to decide that a particular nation-state was, or was not, a body
politic whose "newness" promised rejection of Charter principles. At best
the Iraqi case 106 sketches a few relevant criteria. Iraq, a non-permanent
member of the Security Council, had participated in Council discussions
of the Lebanese question in 1958, when Kassim led a successful revolution
against the Iraqi authorities. Almost immediately the new government
sought to issue credentials to a new Iraqi representative at the United
Nations; 107 concurrently, the Soviet Union challenged the credentials of
Ir. Abbas, the then Iraqi representative. 0 8 In Council discussion, certain
members thought it relevant that the revolutionary government was un-
recognized.0 9 A few argued that it came to power by unconstitutional
means, 110 and some questioned the continuing validity of the Iraqi-Jordan
Union."' The Security Council delayed seating Kassim's delegation for
some seven meetings. Here the principles of responsibility and flexibility
seem to have influenced decision. Whether the same two principles will
guide decision when the credentials of a permanent Council member are
challenged is a question yet to be answered.
B. QUESTIONS OF SUBSEQUENT PARTICIPATION
1. Representation Cases
The United Nations Charter offers no explicit provisions for solving
representation questions. United Nations practice, however, demands a
to defy numerous resolutions adopted by the U.N. organs .. ." U.N. General As-
sembly, 18th Sess., Official Records, Report of the Credentials Committee (Doe. A/
5676/Rev. 1) at 2.
In the Credentials Committee meetings for each of the sessions cited at note 103,
the Soviet Union has invariably challenged the credentials of the Government of the
Republic of China.
105 Cf. U.N. documents cited above, note 103, from the l1th Sess. through the 18th
Sess. See also Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 158-159.
106 See, generally, Higgins, note 1 above, at 159-161.
107 See the statement of the Secretary General to the Security Council, U.N. Security
Council, Official Records, 827th Meeting, at 2 (Doe. S/P.V. 827) (1958). The letter
was cited by the Russian delegate, Mr. Sobolev, at 3 and, according to him, had "been
sent" to all the members of the Council.
108 Per Sobolev, ibid. at 1, 2 and 3.
100I.e., Panama, U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 827th Meeting, at 3, 5
(Doe. S/P.V. 827) (1958); United Kingdom, ibid. at 2-3.
110 Ibid. at 5.
111T id. at 2, 3-4; U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 834th Meeting, at 3
(Doe. S/P.V. 834) (July 18, 1958).
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full contextual analysis before decision: representation questions are to
be decided "in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter
and the circumstances of each case." 112 Past United Nations and League
decisions 1 have looked openly to the authority of the claimants (meas-
ured by their adherence to constitutional forms and principles),111 the
stability and effectiveness of their control over territorial and other re-
sources," 5 and their capacity and -willingness to fulfill their international
obligations.116 Two unstated factors have also been pertinent to League
112 U.N. General Assembly, Res. 396 (V).
113 I.e., in the U.N. the representation of Yemen in 1962 and the representation of
the Congo in 1960; in the League of Nations, the representation of Ethiopia. The
first two decisions are well summarized in Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 161-164.
The Ethiopian case is summarized in Walters, History of the League of Nations 623-
669 (1952).
114B.g., the Congolese decision seemed to turn largely on the interpretation of the
Congo's Loi Fondamentale. See the remarks of the delegates from Ghana, U.N.
General Assembly, 15th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, at 883 (Doe. A/P.V.
918) (1960); the Camerouns, ibid. at 885-886 (Doe. A/P.V. 918); the Philippines,
ibid. at 892 (Doe. A/P.V. 919); the Soviet Union, ibid. at 894-896 (Doe. A/P.V. 919);
Guinea, ibid. at 907-911 (Doe. A/P.V. 920); the Congo (B), ibid. at 917-920 (Doe.
A/P.Y. 921); Czechoslovakia, ibid. at 924-925 (Doe. A/P.V. 921); Liberia, ibid. at
926 (Doe. A/P.V. 921); Poland, ibid. at 927 (Doe. A/P.V. 921); Bulgaria, ibid. at
933 (Doe. A/P.V. 921); Haiti, ibid. at 938-939 (Doe. A/P.V. 922); Albania, ibid. at
940 (Doc. A/P.V. 922); the Central African Republic, ibid. at 914-945 (Doe. A/P.V.
922); and the United States, ibid. at 957 (Doe. A/P.V. 923).
On the Yemen representation question, see, e.g., remarks of the delegates of Jordan,
U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, at 1220 (Doe.
A/P.V. 1201) (1962); of Saudi Arabia, ibid. at 1222 (Doe. A/P.V. 1201) and at 1230-
1231 (Doe. A/P.V. 1202); and of the U.A.R., ibid. at 1228 (Doe. A/P.V. 1202).
On the Ethiopian representation question, in its second report to the second session
of the League Assembly, the Credentials Committee noted that the Ethiopian credentials
were "derived from the same authority as had more than once in the past issued the
full powers of the Ethiopian delegation to previous sessions of the Assembly."
League of Nations Official Journal, 17th Assembly, at 40.
115 In the Congolese representation question, the issues of control were not at all
clear when Mobutu and Lumumba sought to have their delegations represented at the
United Nations. See, generally, U.N. Doe. A/4557 (1961), and the remarks of the
representatives from Ghana, U.N. General Assembly, 15th Sess., Official Records, Plen-
ary Meeting, at 884 (Doe. A/P.V. 918) (1960); and of the Philippines, ibid. at 892
(Doe. A/P.V. 919).
In regard to the Yemen representation question, of. the remarks of the delegates
of Jordan, U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, at
1220 (Doe. A/P.V. 1201); of Saudi Arabia, ibid. at 1222 (Doe. A/P.V. 1201); and of
the U.A.R., ibid.
In the Ethiopian representation question, the League Credentials Committee described
the Ethiopian situation thus:
" The Head of the State is in a foreign country; the Government is no longer in
the capitol; according to some of the documents submitted a governmental authority
is stated to be established in another part of the country. It seems exceptionally diffi-
cult to judge of the nature and extent of the power of that authority, and of the
strength of the connection still existing between it and the Head of this State."
League of Nations Official Journal, 17th Assembly, at 40 (1936).
us In the Congolese representation question the Soviet Union and other Communist-
bloc countries justified their votes against seating the delegation appointed by Mr.
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and United Nations decisions: the legitimacy of origin of the candidates,117
and their dedication to a system of world public order."8  It is dangerous,
however, to generalize about the "importance" of these factors to decision,
for representation cases have been few in number and greatly diverse in
factual context.
Considerable flexibility marks the procedures of past representation
cases. In three cases, a Credentials Committee, acting by simple ma-
jority, appears to have been the responsible decision-maker. 1 9 In one of
these cases, however, the Credentials Committee was in effect a small sum-
mit, with representatives of the Great Powers replacing the regular Com-
mittee members. 2 0  In the two others, the full membership of the world
organization debated the report of a Credentials Committee at considerable
length and with great attention to the substantive impacts of decision.' 21
2. Credentials Cases
Credentials questions were all but ignored at the San Francisco Con-
ference. Neither in the Charter nor in United Nations documents are there
Kasavubu on grounds that his regime was subservient to the United States, Belgium
and colonialism generally. See, e.g., the remarks of the Soviet Union representative
at U.N. General Assembly, 16th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting at 894-901
(Doe. A/P.V. 919). Questions of capacity and willingness to fulfill international ob-
ligations did not arise in the Yemeni case, but were of undoubted importance when
the League Assembly voted to seat Haile Selassie's delegation. See, generally, Walters,
op. cit. note 113 above, at 690.
17 This was a factor of undoubted importance in the Ethiopian case. The Cre-
dentials Committee decided to seat the Ethiopian Delegation because " (t) oo many
Members of the Assembly were resolved not to be dragged any further along the path
which they considered dishonorable." Walters, op. cit. note 113 above, at 690. On
the Congolese decision, see, generally, the comments cited in footnote 93 above.
218 This was a factor of undoubted importance in the Ethiopian case. On the Yemen
decision see the remarks of the Royalist-appointed delegate from Yemen, U.N. General
Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting at 1221 (Doe. A/P.V. 1201)
(1962). On the Congolese decision see the remarks of Czechoslovakia, U.N. General
Assembly, 15th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting at 922-923 (Doe. A/P.V. 921)
(1960); of Bulgaria, ibid. at 933; and of the Ukrainian S.S.R., ibid. at 945 (Doe. A/
P.V. 922).
For two representation decisions in the International Labor Organization, see Liang,
"Rccognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State: Cri-
teria and Procedure," 45 A.J.I.L. 689, 690 (1951).
119I.e., The Congolese, Yemeni and Ethiopian representation decisions.
120 F. P. Walters has described the Ethiopian decision thus:
"In the past, the appointment of the Credentials Committee, and its proceedings,
once appointed, had been a matter of quick-moving routine and necessary to the As-
sembly as to every other international conference, but totally devoid of political in-
terests. Membership had been neither coveted nor avoided: the Secretary drew up a
list, the Assembly accepted it. But on this occasion it proved difficult to find nine
delegates willing to undertake so invidious a task .... Finally Eden and Delbos
had to serve in person and Litvinov joined them, together with other willing delegates-
an unexpected event, since hitherto the Committee had always been composed of dele-
gates of the second and third rank." Walters, op. cit. note 113 above, at 690.
121 Debate on the Congolese question thus covers more than one hundred pages of
General Assembly records.
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explicit statements of the criteria for credentials decisions, and procedures
for credentials approval originate in the Rules of Procedure for each organ,
rather than in Charter articles.122  In United Nations practice, the As-
sembly's Credentials Committee has usually examined only the authenticity
of the documents submitted to it, the identity of the delegates and the
scope of the powers conferred on them.123  There appear to have been no
genuine credentials questions in the Security Council.
V. PAST TRENDS nv DECISION AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE CHINESE
PARTICIPATION QUESTION
In factual context the Chinese participation question is unique among
past participation decisions. The two claimants each control more ex-
tensive bases of power than do many United Nations Members; one, in-
deed, is the world's most populous country. Nationalist China, which has
always sat as the "State of China" at the United Nations, has had astonish-
ing continuity in leadership, institutions and policy since the San Fran-
cisco Conference. Yet the bases of power it now commands, however
extensive, are but a fraction of those it controlled when it became an
original Member of the United Nations. Communist China, on the other
hand, now governs the mainland of "China," but in leadership, cultural
identification, social structures, institutions, objectives and strategies it is
radically different from the "China" that participated in the founding of
the United Nations. Nationalist China and Communist China-spatially
separate and at loggerheads for some fifteen years-have in fact become
two distinct territorial communities. Yet both are loath to admit this,
and neither is willing to adjust its participation claims to contemporary
realities. No international organization has ever faced a participation
question so complex in factual context or so consequential in potential
value outcomes.
A. PAST TRENDS INT SUBSEQUENT PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE CHINESE PARTICIPATION QUESTION
The Chinese participation question is not simply a problem of subse-
quent participation in the United Nations. It is distinct in factual con-
text. 1 24  It is only indirectly concerned with the validity and authenticity
122 See note 11 above.
123 See, e.g., the documents cited at note 103 above.
124In a relatively recent press conference (May 27, 1964; note No. 2932, p. 8),
Secretary General U Thant offered a summary of perspectives as follows:
"The question of the admission or representation of China is sure to come up in
the next session of the General Assembly. Regarding this question, as you are no
doubt aware, there are two schools of thought. One school maintains that the ques-
tion is one of the admission of China-the admission of a new Member State. This
position has been held by the majority of the Member States. On the other hand,
there is another school of thought which maintains that the question is one of representa-
tion and not admission. They argue that China is already a Member of the United
Nations, China being a founding Member of the United Nations. The question is,
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of a delegate's credentials; its real thrust goes to the authority of the
individuals who, and the territorial communities which, issue the cre-
dentials.12r Similarly, although it is commonly labeled as such, the Chinese
participation question is not merely a "representation" question. What-
ever the Chinese claim, China's civil war has been stalemated. Two com-
peting governments are not struggling for power within one territorial
community; rather, two different territorial communities seek disparate
goals in the world arena.
In facts relevant to law, the China participation question bears no re-
semblance to past questions of subsequent participation. In legal essence
it is a problem in the interpretation of fundamental constitutional pre-
scription, and should be determined in accordance with the more funda-
mental policies sought by the Charter. 28 United Nations practice on the
Chinese participation question is sharply distinct from its practice on
questions of subsequent membership. Both the Security Council and the
General Assembly have passed on the Chinese participation question; the
Security Council has never decided on questions of subsequent participa-
tion. A Security Council seat and Great-Power status are at stake in the
Chinese participation question; past subsequent participation decisions have
never dealt with issues of such overriding importance. The Chinese par-
ticipation question has been considered important for voting purposes
under Article 18; past subsequent participation decisions have invariably
been decided by a simple majority. Debates on the Chinese participation
question have examined all characteristics of the two claimants; the cri-
teria for past credentials questions are extraordinarily narrow in focus,
and the criteria for past representation decisions are few and poorly ar-
ticulated. Decision on the Chinese participation question, finally, could
exclude a territorial community from the United Nations. No subsequent
participation decision has had such extraordinary impacts.
In terms of immediate policy consequences it is likewise untenable to
classify the Chinese participation question as a subsequent participation
question. Let us assume that Communist China were seated by special
majority vote as "China" in the General Assembly. It would not neces-
sarily follow that Communist China would sit as "China" in the Security
Council.
First, the Assembly resolution seating the Chinese Communists could
not and would not dictate voting in the Security Council. Assembly Reso-
lution 396(V) stipulated only that Assembly resolutions on "representa-
who should represent China? This is a concept held by some of the Members who,
of course, form the minority. So, on this, I am not competent to take a public posi-
tion. Of course, I have to abide by the decision of the General Assembly when it
meets in the fall."
125 Fitzmaurice, "Chinese Representation in the United Nations," 6 Year Book of
World Affairs 36 (1952), notes that, in passing on the Chinese participation question,
Members will vote "in the light of their view as to the status (of the authority issuing
credentials) and its right to act on behalf of the State concerned . . ." (p. 39).
28 See Pollux, "The Interpretation of the Charter," 23 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 54
(1946).
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tion" questions should -be "taken into account" by other organs of
the United Nations. Often-repeated doctrines which might prevail in
this context, though requiring qualification in others, are that each organ
of the United Nations is autonomous in interpreting the Charter, and that
Assembly resolutions are "recommendatory" and not "binding." Mem-
bers, finally, have noted that their position on the Chinese participation
question in the Assembly would not prejudice action elsewhere in the
Organization.1 27
Second, the Council vote on the Communist Chinese participation ques-
tion is a question of substance under Article 27.12 8 Assuming that a per-
manent member vetoes the Communist Chinese claim, the United Nations
would face the dilemma of having Nationalist China sit as "China" on the
Security Council, and Communist China sit as "China" in the General
Assembly.
This seating pattern could be disastrous for the Organization. Na-
tionalist China could sit in the General Assembly only if it were to apply
for membership as a territorial community other than "China"; it would
further be in the unusual position of passing on its own membership ap-
plication. It would be extraordinarily difficult to apportion the budget be-
tween the two Chinas, to select members of the Secretariat from "China,"
and to recruit United Nations forces from "China." On issues requiring
votes in both the General Assembly and Security Council, the two Chinas
may cast opposing ballots. Conceivably Communist China could not be
elected to non-permanent membership in the Council.
The results would be equally unwelcome if the Security Council vote
should, by some quirk, be regarded as procedural. There would still be
lack of uniformity in the seating of "China" if Nationalist China won the
procedural vote. If, however, Communist China were seated on the
Council, Nationalist China, with a territory and population larger than
those of many U.N. Members, and with an enviable record in the United
Nations and in the international community, would be perpetually excluded
from the Organization. As a permanent member of the Council, Com-
munist China would possess a veto on membership applications. It would
be fanciful to imagine that Communist China (in the absence of prior
agreement) would refrain from vetoing a Nationalist China membership
application.
B. PAST TRENDS IN INITIAL PARTICIPATION AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE
CHINES E PARTICIPATION QUESTION
In factual context the Chinese participation question resembles past
questions of initial participation. The "State of China" is a signatory of
the United Nations Charter and an "original Member" of the United
127 See the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom explaining his
government's vote on the China question in the 17th Session of the General Assembly:
General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, 1162nd Meeting, at 648, 649 (1962).
128 See text below.
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Nations. The original state of China has, however, undergone tremendous
changes in patterns both of authority and effective control, and two dif-
ferent territorial communities now claim to be the state of China. The
community that is called the "Peoples' Republic of China" has, indeed,
changed so drastically that its present perspectives and operations are
completely antithetical to the basic principles of the U.N. Charter and
even threaten the Organization itself. Some further examination of the
factual context, spotlighting patterns both of change and continuity in
authority and effective control over people and resources, is an indis-
pensable prelude to rational appraisal of past trends of decision in relation
to the Chinese participation question.
1. Communist China as a "New" Entity
To appreciate the extent of change in Communist China, it is enough
for present purposes to review an insightful analysis by a leading modern
Sinologist, Professor A. Doak Barnett.'2 9 Change in Communist China,
writes Professor Barnett, has been "more far-reaching, rapid and thorough
than at any time in (China's) long history." 130 In comparative perspec-
tive, it is one of the "few instances in history . . . where the process of
social, political, and economic change has appeared to be so drastic, rapid
and extensive." 131 Although post-1949 change finds its roots in Chinese
history,
the Communists have accelerated the pace of change so greatly that
-what has occurred in recent years appears, in many instances, to bear
little relation to what went on before 1949. The change in degree
has in many instances been so great, in short, that it amounts vir-
tually to a change in kind. 3 2
This "process of revolutionary change" has occurred at a "breakneck
pace." 133 "In many areas of Chinese life, the pace of change has been
maintained, and even accelerated, despite all the resistance deeply im-
bedded in Chinese culture." :34 "Every aspect of Chinese society has been
120 What we seek to establish by this review is that the mere fact that Communist
China now has control over most of the people and territory of the original state of
China does not identify it as the "Republic of China" upon which the United Nations
Charter conferred membership. A state, it may be recalled, is more than mere terri-
tory and people: it is a "body politic" which exhibits both an internal governmental
and social organization and a pattern of external relations. The state of China upon
which the framers and ratiflers of the United Nations Charter thought they were con-
ferring membership certainly is not in any factual sense the same state, as Professor
Barnett's detailed description makes clear, which today exhibits itself upon the main-
land. If a decision be taken, by way of legal fiction, to regard it as the "9same" state,
the question becomes: for what policies and with what probable consequences for world
public order?
130Barnett, Communist China in Perspective 27 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1962); we are indebted to the author and to the publishers for permission to
make extensive use of materials from the book. Cf. Schurmann, Ideology and Organ-
ization in Communist China (1966).
131 Barnett, op. cit. 27. 132 Ibid. at 46.
'133Tbid. at 38. 234bid. at 39.
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affected, and virtually every one of China's 650-700 million people has
been touched in significant ways." 135
The Communist Chinese have worked profound change in the demands
and expectations of their citizenry. Their "Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist-
Maoist" ideology "has become a new orthodoxy in China, one that the
Chinese Communists insist should replace totally not only traditional Con-
fucian values but also the many competing ideological forces that have
penetrated China from the West during the modern period." 130 The
new regime would replace the "ideas of harmony, compromise, adjust-
ment, and stability, which have been so important in the past," 13 with
"a very different set of values and attitudes, emphasizing struggle, change,
progress and innovation." 'll The family "is currently undergoing a
fundamental transformation." 139 The Communists "are trying as rapidly
as possible to minimize the family's functions and to make it clearly sub-
ordinate to other political and economic institutions." They propose to
"create a new generation whose loyalties to the Party and the state will
be so strong as to take precedence automatically over loyalties to the family
or any other group." 140 "The traditional relationships of different age
groups appear to be changing basically." Women are to have "an en-
tirely new role." 14.
There has also been fundamental change in the individual's group re-
lations. "A new class structure ("very different from any in China's
past") 142 has already emerged." A number of traditional classes--
including the landlord-gentry class--"have, for all practical purposes,
disappeared . .." 143 The military has experienced a "spectacular rise"
in "social prestige." 144 The older intellectuals "have .. .been subjected
to vigorous indoctrination and severe political controls," and "a new
young Communist intelligentsia .. .has slowly begun to replace them." 145
The "business, industrial and commercial" classes have been almost com-
pletely "absorbed" 140 into the Communist Chinese economic bureaucracy.
The mainland populace has been politicized, bureaucratized, and regi-
mented at an "accelerated rate." 147
Even the individual's cultural life has been affected. The Chinese
language, in both its written and spoken forms, is "undergoing a revolu-
tionary change." 148 No longer is there free expression in art; art now is
to "serve the cause of revolution." Indeed, "a new utilitarian and revo-
lutionary philosophy of aesthetics motivates the Chinese Communists' ap-
proach to art and literature." 149
135 Ibid. at 27. 130 Ibid. at 37.
137 1bid. at 37-38. 188 Tbid. at 38.
139 Ibid. at 34. 140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. at 35. 142 Ibid. at 33.
143 Ibid. at 32. 144 Ibid. at 35.
145 Ibid. at 33. 140 Ibid.
147 Ibid. at 30. 148 Ibid. at 35.
149 Ibid. at 36.
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Mfore dramatic has been the change in leadership objectives:
The Chinese Communist aim has been to alter, fundamentally, the
entire nature of Chinese society; its political system-the exercise of
leadership and the distribution of power; its economic structure-
the ownership, organization, and management of production, as well
as the distribution of output; its social structure-the pattern of exist-
ing classes and groups and their inter-relationships; and its basic
ideology and system of values-the common assumptions generally
held about the nature of man and his relationship to the universe,
to society, and to his fellow man.150
To achieve these objectives, the Communist Chinese have transformed
the institutions of mainland China. The governmental structure, based
on the Soviet model, is a "great innovation . ..for China," '-" and gov-
ernmental functions have increased "enormously." 152 "An even more
striking innovation has been the creation of innumerable mass political
organizations. ... " which "serve as unprecedented channels for extending
the outreach of central political power. . . ." The Communists have also
created "the strongest and most unified, centralized, modernized, and
politicized army in Chinese history . ,, 153 Economic institutions have
been "fundamentally altered" 15' to yield "an unprecedented degree of
state mobilization, allocation, and direction of China's material and human
resources." 5  "Almost all the traditional, nongovernmental social in-
stitutions that were so important in China in the past have gone into
eclipse." 156
At the base of these institutional changes has been the Communist Party
of China. "The political, social, and economic leadership of China has
changed hands at almost every level . . ." since 1949, and "an almost
entirely new leadership group-the Chinese Communist Party and its
various supporters-has assumed control." A "new political elite, a new
ruling 'class,' has taken over." 157 And this party practices a type of
discipline "that most observers, before the Communist take-over, would
have labelled 'un-Chinese' .... 158
These institutional developments dramatize Communist Chinese control
over mainland resources. China's "first effective totalitarian regime"
has restored "centralized rule over most of the traditional Chinese em-
pire. . . . "19 "The entire economy has been restructured." "Prop-
erty and income have been drastically redistributed, and . . . wealth has
been dramatically leveled." As for the mainland Chinese populace,
[t]he Communists in China are true believers in, and practitioners of,
"totalism," involving maximum control and supervision of ordinary
people's lives, maximum involvement of the entire Chinese population
in state-directed activities, maximum control over people's thoughts
and behavior, and maximum mobilization of China's millions to serve
the purpose of the nation's new Communist regime.160
160 Ibid. at 27. 15, Ibid. at 29.
152 Ibid. at 30. 153 Ibid.
154 Ibid. at 32. 155 Ibid. at 31.
156 Ibid. at 33-34. 157 Ibid. at 28.
158 Ibid. at 29. 19 Ibid. at 28.
16o Ibid. at 31.
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It is added that "remarkable new techniques and methods for propagandiz-
ing and indoctrinating the population have been developed to a level of
great efectiveness." '-
In the international arena change in Communist China has been equally
obvious. Communist China has not merely "leaned to one side." It has
moved in political orientation from the right-center of the free-world
nations to the extreme left of the Communist bloc,162 and its alliances
differ drastically from pre-1949 China's. 1 6 3  Communist China's short-
term and long-range objectives are totally different from its predecessor's,
and its actions, instead of promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes,
threaten the foundations of world order. 64 Communist China, indeed,
has virtually proclaimed itself a "new"state, for it has claimed for itself
the exclusive right to decide which of its predecessor's treaty obligations
it would honor, and which it would not.18 5
16l1bid. at 30.
162Ibid. at 30. For general analyses of Communist China's foreign policy, see
Barnett, Communist China and Asia (1960) and sources cited at pp. 558-559; idem
(ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia (1963); Boyd, Communist China's Foreign
Policy (1962) and sources cited at pp. 142-144; Cooley, East Wind Over Africa (1965);
Clubb, Twentieth Century China (1964), esp. pp. 368-395; Halperin, China and the
Bomb (1965); Halperin and Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (1965); Hal-
perin and Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International
Behavior," 59 Am. Pol. Sci. Q. 80 (1965); Halpern, "China in the Postwar World,"
21 China Quarterly 20 (1965); idem, "Communist China's Foreign Policy: The
Recent Phase," 11 China Quarterly 89 (1962); iden (ed.), Policies Toward China:
Views from Six Continents (1965); Hinton, Communist China in World Politics
(1966); idem, Communist China's External Policy and Behavior as a Nuclear Power
(1963); Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (1962); Pentony
(ed.), China, The Emerging Red Giant (1962), particularly the North and Whiting
articles at pp. 48 and 53, respectively.
163 For charts listing, as of March 1, 1965, the countries recognizing either the
People's Republic of China or the Government of the Republic of China, see Halpern,
Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents 496-501 (1965).
1e Authoritative statements of Communist Chinese views on war and peace occur
throughout The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Move-
ment, a volume published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, in 1965, which
contains major editorials from the People's Daily and Red Flag from the 1963-1964
period (cited as "Polemic").
For comparative analysis of, and documents on, Communist Chinese and Soviet views
of minimum order and other issues, see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Con-
flict (1961); Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (1963); Dallin (ed.),
Diversity in International Communism (1963), especially the introduction; Griffith, Al-
bania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (1963); Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (1964); Mosely,
"The Chinese-Soviet Rift: Origins and Portents," 42 Foreign Affairs 11 (1963); Lowen-
thai, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (1965); Zagoria, The
Sino-Soviet Conflict (1962). For other sources see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift 491-
492 (1964).
165 For a recent explanation of this policy, see People's Daily, "A Comment on the
Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.," March 8, 1963, in 10/11 Peking
Review 58, 61 (March 15, 1963).
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2. The Consequences of Change in Communist China for United Nations
Policies
Communist China's newness explicitly promises ill for the United Na-
tions.166 At present the government's stated long-range foreign policy
objectives are antithetical to the purposes of the U.N. Charter. It has
challenged the right of the United Nations to exist as a world organization,
demanded institutional changes in the Organization, and acted in so
strident a fashion in other organizations as to belie the possibility that it
would co-operate, even on procedural matters, with the Members of the
United Nations. In public pronouncement and occasional action Com-
munist China has challenged virtually every exercise of U.N. powers. It
has either ignored or maligned United Nations efforts for decolonialization.
It has opposed virtually all United Nations actions for the maintenance
of international peace and security. It has refused to participate in dis-
armament conferences under the aegis of the United Nations, and its own
disarmament proposals have been near facetious. It has, finally, depre-
cated United Nations attempts at economic and social co-operation.
The principal purposes of the United Nations are twofold: "to maintain
international peace and security". .. (and) "to develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. . . .1 67 Contrast these objectives with the
following statement, regarded by many as authoritative, of Communist
Chinese global strategy-a statement demonstrating that Communist China
has projected onto the world arena the strategy it used successfully in
its civil war:
It must be emphasized that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the
establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement
of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal
practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all
the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolu-
tionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa
and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys.
Many countries and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America
are now being subjected to aggression and enslavement on a serious
scale by the imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys.
The basic political and economic conditions in many of these countries
have many similarities to those that prevailed in old China. As in
China, the peasant question is extremely important in these regions.
166 For a comprehensive, authoritative analysis of Communist China's view of the
United Nations, consult Adams, Communist China and the United Nations (1964)
(Master's essay on file at the Burgess-Carpenter Library of Columbia University).
The Chinese Communists have been no less kind to the League of Nations:
.. . the League of Nations is a League of Robbers by which the various im-
perialisms are dismembering China. The principal task of the Lytton Commission of
Enquiry sent to China by the League was to prepare the dismemberment of China and
the repression of all the revolutionary movements that have raised the flag of the
Chinese Soviets." From a telegram, dated Oct. 6, 1932, and signed (inter alia) by Mao
Tse-tung, in Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung 266-267 (1963).
167 U.N. Charter, Art. 1, pars. 1, 2.
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The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the broad
areas in which the revolutionaries can manoeuvre freely .. . [and]
can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries
can go forward to final victory. Precisely for this reason, Comrade
Mao Tse-tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in
the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is
attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions.
Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe
can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin
America constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World
War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various rea-
sons been temporarily held back in North American and West
European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary move-
ment in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously.
In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture
of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas. In the final
analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolu-
tionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples
who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.
The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty
to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and
Latin America.168
It is this last issue-the Communist-bloc support of "national wars of
liberation" and "revolutionary civil wars" "--that jars most sharply
against the United Nations' dedication to minimum order. For the past
eight years the Chinese Communists have urged greater risk-taking on the
Communist blocY.70 Their position rests basically on five propositions:
(1) ". . . the U. S. imperialists are the wildest militarists of modern
times, the wildest plotters of a new world war, and the most ferocious
16sLin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," in 36 Peking Review 9, 14
(Sept. 3, 1965). See also Resolution of the Indonesian Communist Party, in 13 ibid.
17 (March 27, 1964), analyzed by Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," 8
Orbis 36, 42 (1964).
Lin Piao's statement seems a chimerical rendition of the more traditional "united
front" tactic. Of. Statements by Mao Tse-tung, 20 Peking Review 6 (May 14, 1965),
and 5 ibid. 5 (Jan. 31, 1964).
le9 It is not unlikely that the Communist Chinese Will adjust their strategy, at least
temporarily, if they continue to suffer strategic defeats in the Afro-Asian world. For
valuable and analogous insights, see Brzezinskl and Huntington, Political Power:
USA/USSR (1964). For a Communist Chinese response to the Hilsman thesis, which
held out the promise of more salutory U.S.-Communist Chinese relations to the second
generation of Peking leaders, see 30 Peking Review 19 (July 24, 1964); see also
People's Daily, "Cultivating and Training Millions of Successors to Proletarian Revo-
lution," Aug. 3, 1964, in 32 ibid. 12 (Aug. 7, 1964).
170 This is the opinion of many specialists on Communist Chinese foreign policy.
See, e.g., Barnett, Communist China in Perspective 80; Halperin, China and the Bomb
13-14 (1965); Halpern, "China in the Postwar World," note 162 above, at 36-38; Hin-
ton, op. cit. note 162 above, at 155-156; Hsich, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue:
1963," 8 Journal of Conflict Resolution 99, 105 (1964); Lowenthal, "China," in
Brzezinski (ed.), Africa and the Communist World 142, 149 (1963); Mosely, note 164
above, at 16-17; Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," 8 Orbis 36, 44
(1964); Zagoria, note 164 above, at 245-246.
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enemy of world peace"; 1' (2) since 1957 the Communist bloc has had
moral and material superiority over the free world; 172 (3) the Afro-Asian
world-the "storm center" of "world revolution"--is a prime present
target for the Communist bloc; ',3 (4) it is unlikely that national wars of
liberation will escalate into world wars; 14 and (5) the cost of possible
escalation is more than offset by probable gains. 7 5
For the fifth proposition, we do well to recall Mikhail Suslov's recent
analysis, 7 1 discounting, of course, its possible polemic content:
In their fight against the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, which
they counter with the idea of giving revolution a "push" by means
of war, the CPC leaders have gone as far as to assert that war is an
acceptable and, in fact, the only means of settling the contradictions
between capitalism and socialism. They ignore the experience of
171 Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, "Two Different Lines
on the Question of War and Peace," in Polemic, note 164 above, at 221, 235.
The U. S. nuclear threat was a principal stated justification for the first of Com-
munist China's nuclear tests. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic
of China, Oct. 16, 1964, in 42 Peking Review, Spec. Supp. ii (Oct. 16, 1964).
172 The United States, in the Communist Chinese view, is over-extended. Lo Jul-
eing, "Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascisml Carry the Struggle Against
U. S. Imperialism Through to the EndI" (published in Red Flag), in 20 Peking
Review 7, 13 (May 14, 1965); Peng Chen, speech of May 25, 1965, in 24 ibid. 10, 13
(June 11, 1965); People's Daily, "A Great People, A Glorious Banner," Dec. 20,
1964, in 52 ibid. 11, 12 (Dee. 25, 1964).
17 See, e.g., Shilh Tsu-chih, "The Fundamental Path for the Liberation Movements
in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Areas," in Studies in International Affairs, No. 5,
May 3, 1960, 6024 JPRS 41-55; Chou En-lai, speech of Dee. 25, 1963, "African
People's Example of Daring to Wage Armed Struggle and Seize Victory," in 1 Peking
Review 34 (Jan. 3, 1964); Zagoria, note 164 above, at 360; Chou En-lai, speech of
Jan. 8, 1964, in 3 Peking Review 18, 21 (Jan. 17, 1964).
174,,... (the Chinese Communists) seem to have been guided not by a desire to
bring on a general war but by the perhaps correct calculation that more vigorous Soviet
action would not lead to general nuclear war." (Italics ours.) Halperin, note 162
above, at 14; see also ibid. at 39; Halperin and Perkins, note 162 above, at 58; Hinton,
Communist China in the World Community 155 (1966); Zagoria, note 164 above, at
356-357.
175 See particularly Zagoria, note 164 above, at 312-316. Armed struggle has been
the "correct path" in Cuba (31 Peking Review 20 (July 31, 1964)); in the Congo
(People's Daily, "No Change of Horses in the Congo Can Save the U.S. from
Defeat," in part in 29 Peking Review 33, 34 (July 17, 1964)); in Malaya (C.P.C.C.C.
letter of April 15, 1965, to the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party, in
19 Peking Review 6 (May 7, 1966)); for "Africans Who Want to Win and Sustain
Independence" (People's Daily, "Long Live the Free and Independent New Africa,"
April 15, 1965, in 16 Peking Review 9, 11 (April 17, 1964)); in Algeria, Chou En-lai,
speech of Dec. 25, 1964, in 1 Peking Review 29 (Jan. 3, 1964)).
170 Cf. XVI (13) CDSP 5, 9-10 (April 22, 1964). Recent Communist Chinese policy
pronouncements still possess the ardor Suslov has described: "The peoples want revolu-
tion and liberation, and there is no weapon that can intimidate them. The atom bomb
can scare only the cowards who have lost their revolutionary will, it cannot scare revolu-
tionaries." Lo Jui-ching, "The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can
Certainly Defeat U. S. Imperialism Too," speech of Sept. 3, 1965, in 36 Peking Review
31, 33 (Sept. 3, 1965); see also Statement of the Government of the People's Republic
of China, 11 ibid. 6, 7 (March 12, 1965); Lin Ning-i, speech of July 28, 1965, in 32
ibid. 23 (Aug. 6, 1965); 20 ibid. 13 (May 14, 1965).
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the world Communist movement and exalt the road of the victorious
revolution in China as something absolute, trying to make it an in-
controvertible truth for all countries and peoples. On every occasion,
whether suitable or not, Chinese propaganda quotes what Mao Tse-
tung said about war and peace in the thirties, during the civil war in
China.
Among the widely popularised statements of Mao Tse-tung are the
following: "the war to be waged by the overwhelming majority of
mankind will pass into a new era in history;" "the world can only
be reorganised by means of the rifle;" "we stand for abolishing war,
we have no use for it, but war can only be abolished through war.
If you want rifles to go out of existence, take to the rifle."
Almost three decades have passed since those statements were made.
Radical changes have occurred in the world-the world socialist sys-
tem has formed and has become a mighty force....
The Chinese leaders refuse to take all [this] into consideration.
Plainly showing off their irresponsible attitude, they affirm that a
nuclear bomb is a "paper tiger" and in no way affects the issue of
war and peace. In keeping with this logic, which runs counter to
elementary common sense, Mao Tse-tung, speaking at the Moscow meet-
ing in 1957, argued that the struggle for socialism even stood to gain
from a world thermonuclear war. "Can one foresee," he said, "the
number of human lives that the future war may take 7 It may be one-
third of the 2,700 million inhabitants of the world, that is, a mere
900 million people . .. I had an argument over this matter with
Nehru. He is more pessimistic in this respect than I. I told him
that should half of mankind be destroyed, the other half would sur-
vive; in return, imperialism would be wiped out completely and
there would be only socialism in the world. In half a century or a
whole century the population would grow again-even by more than
half." 177
'When proposing strategies for the Communist bloc, the Communist
Chinese have not stopped at urging increased risk-taking in national wars
of liberation; they have urged that the bloc participate to a greater extent
177 1n detailed exposition of the Chinese Communist attitude toward nuclear war,
Suslov continues to document the Chinese unconcern with the certain destruction of
large numbers of individuals, Communist and non-Communist:
"This concept is even more lucidly expressed in the collection of articles Long Live
Leninism! which the CC CPC has approved and is circulating. 'On the ruins of fallen
imperialism,' it says, 'the victorious people will build a thousand times more won-
derful future at an extremely rapid rate.' That is the kind of ultrarevolutionary
verbiage, complete political irresponsibility that is particularly dangerous because it
is being demonstrated by people standing at the helm of a large socialist country.
"Here it would be appropriate to recall certain facts. When in a conversation
with Tao Chu, member of the CC CPC, a Czechoslovak journalist mentioned that in
the event of a thermonuclear war the whole of Czechoslovakia, where 14 million people
live, might be destroyed, the answer he received was: 'In the event of a war of anni-
hilation, the small countries in the socialist camp will have to subordinate their interests
to the common interests of the camp as a whole.' Another high-ranking CPR official
told Soviet representatives that Comrade Togliatti, General Secretary of the Italian
Communist Party, was wrong when expressing anxiety for the fate of his people he
said that if a thermonuclear war broke out the whole of Italy would be destroyed.
'Other people will remain,' declared this official, 'and imperialism will be wiped
out .... I I I id.
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in "local wars."""78 For local Communist parties, they have virtually
denied the possibility of peaceful change. 7 9  In this last context it may be
well to recall portions of an official Communist Chinese statement:
. .. in no country should the proletariat and the Communist Party
slacken their preparations for the revolution in any way. They must
be prepared at all times to repulse counter-revolutionary attacks and,
at the critical juncture of the revolution when the working class is
seizing state power, to overthrow the bourgeoisie by armed force if it
uses armed force to suppress the people's revolution (generally
speaking, it is inevitable that the bourgeoisie will do so).
In the present situation of the international communist movement, it
is advantageoits from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire
for peaceful transition. But it would be inappropriate to over-
emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition. The reasons are:
1. If too much stress is laid on the possibility of peaceful transition,
and especially on the possibility of seizing state power by winning a
majority in parliament, it is liable to weaken the revolutionary will
of the proletariat, the working people and the Communist Party and
disarm them ideologically.
2. To the best of our knowledge, there is still not a single country
where this possibility is of any practical significance. 180  (Our italics.)
Events have, unfortunately, demonstrated that there is more than fire-
eating rhetoric to these goal statements. Communist China has partici-
pated in "local wars" in Korea in 1950,181 in Quemoy and Matsu in 1955
178 "Local" wars, in Communist terminology, are wars started by the "imperialist
powers"; "wars of national liberation" are begun by indigenous Communist or nation-
alist forces. See Halperin and Perlins, note 162 above, at 57, and Zagoria, note 164
above, who describes at pp. 195-199 Sino-Soviet differences over the handling of
the Middie East crisis of 1958.
179 "At (the 1957 Moscow meeting of Communist parties), the chief subject of
controversy between us and the delegation of the CPSU was the transition from capi-
talism to socialism. In their original draft of the Declaration (the product of the
meeting) the leadership of the CPSU insisted on the inclusion of the erroneous views of
the 20th Congress on peaceful transition. The original draft said not a word about
non-peaceful transition; moreover, it described peaceful transition as 'securing a ma-
jority in parliament and transforming parliament from an instrument of the bourgeois
dictatorship into a genuine people's state power.' . . . The Chinese Communist Party
resolutely opposed the wrong views contained in the draft declaration submitted by
the leadership of the CPSU." Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red
Flag, "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of
the CPSU and Ourselves," in Polemic, note 164 above, at 55, 73.
In the Congo, the "parliamentary path to power" was an "lllusion." People's
Daily, "People of the Congo (Leopoldville), Fight on! ", May 6, 1964, in 20 Peking
Review 14, 15 (May 15, 1964). See, generally, People's Daily, "The Differences Be-
tween Comrade Togliatti and Us," Dec. 31, 1962, in Dallin, Diversity in International
Communism 706 (1963); People's Daily, "More on the Differences Between Comrade
Togliatti and Us," in ibid. at 794.
1soEditorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red lag, "The Origin and
Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves,"
Appendix I, in Polemic, note 164 above, at 105-106.
181 Cf. General Assembly Res. 498 (V) (Feb. 1, 1951); Whiting, China Crosses the
Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (1960).
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and 1958,182 in Tibet in 1959,188 in India in 1962,184 and in Sikkim in 1965.11s
In Africa it has actively supported "wars of national liberation" in Bur-
undi,181 the Federal Republic of Cameroon 1 7 and the Congo (Leopold-
ville), s18 In these conflicts, except with respect to Korea, Communist
China displayed guerrilla-type caution, skillfully limited the scope of the
conflict, and successfully avoided a direct confrontation with the United
States."8 9 Communist China's contemporary tactics thus parallel strik-
ingly the tactics practiced in China's civil war, and suggest that Communist
Chinese long-term goal statements have considerable empirical content-
a content which would subvert the purposes and principles of the U.N.
Charter.
In short-range tactics, Communist China has challenged the right of the
United Nations to exist as a world organization.190 It has threatened crea-
182 Hinton, note 174 above, at 258-272; Hsieh, note 162 above, at 17-18, 123-130;
Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kal-shek and the United States," 12 Western
Pol Q. 1084 (1959); idem, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," 3 Orbis 332
(1959); Whiting, "The Logic of Communist China's Policy: The First Decade," in
Pentony, note 162 above, at 70, 7-81; Zagoria, note 164 above, at 200-221.
188 Cf. General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV); 1723 (XVI): Barnett, Com-
munist China and Asia 314-315 (1960); Hinton, note 174 above, at 285-289.
184Hinton, note 174 above, at 273-307; Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (1964).
See also Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (1965), who believes the
Indian invasion was undertaken "gas an essay in forcing tactics vis-a-vis Moscow."
(p. 144.)
185 See, generally, Pringsheim, "China's Role in the Indo-Paklstani Conflict," 24
China Quarterly 170 (1965). Liu Shao-chi, in a speech of Sept. 28, 1965, had this
to say of the U.N. and Kashmir:
"As everybody knows, the United Nations has completely betrayed its own charter
and it is in a mess. Recently on the Kashmir issue it disregarded the explicit state-
ment in the charter about national self-determination and discarded its past resolu-
tions providing for a 'plebiscite'. This is another entry in the shameful record of
the United Nations." 40 Peking Review 15, 16 (Oct. 1, 1965).
See also Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, Sept. 7,
1965, in 37 Peking Review 6 (Sept. 10, 1965), ibid. at 7; 38 ibid. 11 (Sept. 17, 1965),
ibid. at 14; 39 ibid. 8 (Sept. 24, 1965), ibid. at 9 and 13-16.
186 Cooley, note 162 above, at 109-112; Hinton, note 174 above, at 193.
18s Cooley, note 162 above, at 99-103; Hinton, note 174 above, at 192.
188 s urping the name of the United Nations, the United States has placed the
Congo under military occupation . . ." "The Chinese people have always staunchly
supported the Congolese people's just struggle against imperialism and for national
independence." People's Daily, "People of the Congo, (Leopoldville), Fight oni ",
May 6, 1964, in 20 Peking Review 14, 16, 17 (May 15, 1964).
189 Whiting, loc. cit. note 182 above, has skillfully demonstrated Chinese "caution."
For recent Communist Chinese attempts to subvert stable regimes, of. Topping, "Peking
Pressing Overseas Chinese," New York Times, July 10, 1965, p. 3, col. 2; (Burma),
ibid., Nov. 1, 1964, p. 26, col. 4; (Congo), ibid., Nov. 27, 1965, p. 1, col 1.
18041(The people) have come to realize that the U. S. imperialist-manipulated
United Nations is by no means something sacrosanct, that one can oppose the United
Nations and withdraw from it and that one can do without entering it." Chou En-lai,
speech of Jan. 24, 1965, in 5 Peking Review 5 (JTan. 29, 1965).
Compare the Communist Chinese stand with the "Final Communique of Second
Afro-Asian Conference Preparatory Meeting," in 17 Peking Review 6 (April 24,
1964), -which sought the strengthening of the United Nations.
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tion of a "revolutionary world organization" 191 if the United Nations "is
not thoroughly reorganized." 192 "Thorough reorganization" presumably
means that "the U.N. Charter must be reviewed and revised jointly by
all countries, big and small; all independent states should be included in
the United Nations; and all imperialist's puppets should be expelled." 
193
For Communist China neither the increase in Afro-Asian membership 94
nor the expansion of the Security Council and ECOSOC "' meets the re-
quirements of "thorough reorganization." Apparently the United Nations
must admit East Germany, North Viet-Nam and North Korea, and exclude
such "imperialist-dominated" countries as Mlalaysia. 196
Even beyond threatening to create a rival organization, Communist
China has attempted to subvert the institutional base of the United Na-
191The Communist Chinese have never clarified the constitutional basis of this
organization. Presumably they thought that Communist China, Indonesia, and pos-
sibly Cambodia and Pakistan, would provide the initial membership. At a later date,
the Communist Chinese seem to have assumed, the initial membership would be joined
by the "emerging" "revolutionary" nations of Asia and Africa.
102 Predecessors of this threat include Statement by the Government of the People's
Republic of China, Jan. 10, 1965, in 3 Peking Review 5 (Jan. 15, 1965) ("thoroughly
remolded"); People's Daily, "Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action," Jan. 10,
1965, in ibid. 7 (Jan. 15, 1965) ("thorough overhaul") at 9.
For the threat itself see Chou En-lai, speech of Jan. 24, 1965, in 5 Peking Review 5
(Jan. 29, 1965); Chen Yi, speech of Jan. 26, 1965, ibid. at 7; reaffirmed and modified
by Chen Yi, Press Conference of Sept. 20, 1965, in 41 Peking Review 7, 12 (Oct. 8,
1965).
The threat parallels tactics the Communist Chinese have resorted to in the inter-
national Communist movement and elsewhere:
"The Chinese leaders do not limit themselves to proclaiming incorrect views. They
are now striving wherever possible to isolate the democratic public organizations of
(Asia, Africa and Latin America), to create separate, enclosed confederations and
actually to oppose them to the international confederations of the working people."
Kommunist, "Marxism-Leninism is the Basis for the Unity of the Communist Move-
ment," Oct. 18, 1963, in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift 466, 468 (1964).
193Presumably the Communist Chinese would eliminate from the United Nations
all bodies of limited and specialized membership. "In international affairs, all coun-
tries should have equal rights. There should be absolutely no distinction between big
and small ones .... " Observer, "The More He Tries to Cover Up, The More He
Exposes-On Adlai Stevenson's U.N. Speech," People's Daily, Feb. 1, 1965, in 6
Peking Review 12 at 13 (Feb. 5, 1965).
194 'The increase in the number of Asian and African members in the United Na-
tions has by no means brought any fundamental change in the fact that the U.N.
has become a U. S. imperialist instrument for aggression." People's Daily, Jan. 10,
1965, in 3 Peking Review 8 (Jan. 15, 1965).
1r The Communist Chinese demanded "thorough" reorganization after they editori-
ally approved the membership increase in ECOSOC and the Security Council. Of.
sources cited in note 197 below.
196 Communist China has declared "illegal" the seating of Malaysia in the United
Nations and the Security Council. Chou Bn-lai, speech of Jan. 24, 1965, in 5 Peking
Review 5 (Jan. 29, 1965). It also sought to exclude Malaysia from the Second
Afro-Asian Conference. Cf. 33 ibid. 18 (Aug. 13, 1965).
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tions.197  It has urged *10  and supported withdrawal from the United
Nations itself and from U.N. Committees.199 It has heaped invective on
the three Secretaries General, 20 0 and presumably believes that the Secre-
tariat cannot be an important "neutral" organ for dispute settlement.201
It has overlooked the Assembly's r~le as a "world forum," 20 2 and it sees
197 This is not to say that Communist Chinese policy has not been specialized to
particular situations. At times they have proclaimed adherence to the Charter and
support for the United Nations. Cf. Chou En-lai's press conference in Somalia of
Feb. 3, 1964, 7 Peking Review 14, 15 (Feb. 14, 1964). Compare this with his press
conference in Cairo a year later, printed in 15 ibid. 8 (April 9, 1965).
Communist China has also reversed positions to support increased membership in
the Security Council and ECOSOC. Chou En-lai's press conference, above. For the
previous Communist Chinese position, which proclaimed the seating of Communist
China a pro-condition to enlargement of the Security Council and ECOSOC, of. 2637
SCMP 43 (1964).
105Communist China's prime targets here have been Pakistan and Cambodia. A
"China-Pakistan Joint Communique" of March 7, 1965, claimed that "the United
Nations should reorganize itself in order to better reflect the balance of forces in
the world and present international realities." 11 Peking Review 10 (March 12,
1965). This 'was not a reference to expansion of ECOSOC and the Security Council.
For a similar statement in a Sino-Burmese communique, of. 32 ibid. 30 (Aug. 6, 1965).
1 99 Iiu Shao-chi, on Sept. 28, 1965, declaimed at a state banquet in honor of Prince
Sihanouk:
"Recently, Cambodia withdrew from the U.N. special committee of decolonialization.
This is another just and courageous action following Indonesia's withdrawal from the
United Nations. It is a resounding slap in the face of the apologists for noo-colonial-
ism as well as a protest of non co-operation against the U. S. control of the United
Nations." 40 Peking Review 15, 16 (Oct. 1, 1965).
For Communist Chinese approval of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Na-
tions and the Specialized Agencies, see Statement of the Government of the People's
Republic of China, Jan. 10, 1965, in 3 Peking Review 5 (Jan. 15, 1965); People's
Daily, "Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action," Jan. 10, 1965, ibid. 7 (Jan. 15,
1965); ibid. 10 (Jan. 15, 1965); 5 ibid. 9 (Jan. 29, 1965).
200Trygve Lie, the Communist Chinese claimed, was a "servile American stoogo,"
"an instrument and accomplice of aggression for the United States," "an out-and-out
American tool and jackal," and a "Wall Street majordomo from head to foot."
NCNA, April 8, 1952, in 313 SCMP 2 (1952).
The Communist Chinese deemed it "necessary" to "remove Dag Hammarskjold,
executor of the imperialist and colonialist policies, from the office of U.N. Secretary
General." People's Daily, Feb. 18, 1961, 2443 SCP 32, 34.
U Thant has been thought to be "acting" as "Washington's political broker,"
People's Daily, "U.N.-Sanetuary for the Indian Aggressor," Sept. 14, 1965, in 38
Peking Review 14 at 15 (Sept. 17, 1965); an "agent of U. S. imperialism," People's
Daily, "The Second African-Asian Conference Should be Postponed," Oct. 23, 1965, in
44 ibid. 8 (Oct. 29, 1965).
201 The Communist Chinese have paid little attention to the activities of the Secre-
tariat. Adams, note 166 above, thus found no Chinese commentary on the Soviet
Union's "troika" proposal. But of. comments quoted in note 200 above.
202In Peking's view the 19th Assembly was a "farce," proving the United Na-
tions "shamelessly" manipulated by the United States. 37 Peking Review 30 (Sept.
10, 1965). By the 20th Session the Assembly had become "a conference for opposing
the revolutionary movements of the oppressed nations, and oppressed peoples . . . a
conference which wilfully interfered in the internal affairs of sovereign states and a
conference for pursuing the policy of American-Soviet cooperation for the domination
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the Council rendered impotent by the United States veto.20 3  In its view
the Specialized Agencies are a "trap" for the non-committed countries.20 4
Communist China, indeed, has virtually attempted to dictate terms for
its own participation in the United Nations:
The United Nations must rectify its mistakes and undergo a thor-
ough reorganization and reform. It must admit and correct all its
past mistakes. Among other things, it should cancel its resolution
condemning China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
as aggressors and adopt a resolution condemning the United States
as the aggressor; the U.N. Charter must be reviewed and revised
jointly by all countries, big and small; all independent states should
be included in the United Nations; and all imperialist puppets should
be expelled. 20 5
In public pronouncement Communist China has either ignored or chal-
lenged virtually every activity of the United Nations. On decolonializa-
tion questions it has largely overlooked the accomplishments of the U.N.
of the world." People's Daily, "The U.N A Market Place for the U.S.-Soviet
Political Deals," Dec. 27, 1965, in 1 Peking Review 13 (Jan. 1, 1966).
The Communist Chinese review of the 15th Assembly included these comments:
" The U.N. General Assembly remains a tool of U. S. imperialism, a voting machine for
it to pursue its policies of aggression and war. . . . The people of the world should in
no way place their hopes for their liberation and for world peace on the United Nations
which is dominated by U. S. imperialism." 2364 SOMP 40, 41 (1960).
203E.g.: "As to Britain, France and the Soviet Union, although they are permanent
members of the Security Council, they in fact cannot do much. Occasionally their
proposals are adopted but only when they accord with or at least do not run counter
to the interests of the United States." People's Daily, "Whither the United Nations,"
Feb. 15, 1965, in 8 Peking Review 13, 14 (Feb. 19, 1965).
204 Nan Han-chen, speaking at an Afro-Asian Economic Seminar on Feb. 23, 1965,
declared that:
"At the same time, it must also be pointed out that so-called 'multilateral aid'
through international organizations is a new trap set by the neo-eolonialists to exploit
the Afro-Asian countries. As is well known, the so-called International Monetary
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),
the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association
are all 'political banks' with U. S. imperialism as their nerve centre for carrying out
activities of aggression .... (The) debtor countries, in addition to submitting their
national economic policy and planning to be 'reviewed' by the World Bank and ac-
cepting its 'supervision' over the use of such loans .. ." 10 Peking Review 16, 19
(March 5, 1965). See also Red Flag, Feb. 4, 1964, in 407 SCMM 42, 51.
Communist China has labeled the WHO "A U.S.-dominated agency conducting es-
pionage activities under the name of health." NONA, April 8, 1952, in 313 SOMP
2, 3 (1952).
For the Communist Chinese the League of Nations was a "League of Robbers":
the "principal task of the Lytton Commission . . .was to prepare the dismemberment
of China... 1." Extract from an Oct. 6, 1932, telegram of the Chinese Soviet Govern-
ment, in Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung 266-267 (1963). For con-
temporary corroboration of this view, of. 6 Peking Review 14 (Feb. 5, 1965).
203 Press Conference of Chen Yi, Communist Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister, on Sept. 29, 1965, in 41 Peking Review 7, 11-12 (Oct. 8, 1965). For a
milder predecessor to this statement, of. Chou En-lai's writ en responses to questions
asked by Kamal Amer, 38 ii. 8 (Sept. 17, 1965).
1966]
HeinOnline -- 60 Am. J. Int'l L.  711 1966
THE AIERICAN JOURNAL OP INTERNATIONAL LAW
trusteeship system, the Committee of 16, and the Committee of 21.20 It
would circumvent the world organization:
(T)he oppressed nations must not pin their hopes of liberation on the
"benevolence" of the old or new colonialists or on "bestowal" from
the United Nations which is manipulated by U.S. imperialism, and
they must rely on themselves to wage resolute revolutionary
struggle. . . . "Without revolutionary violence it would be impossible
to wipe out counter-revolutionary violence."
According to Khrushchov, the revolutionary people of Asia, Africa
and Latin America should not and cannot themselves eliminate colo-
nialism, but must look to the United Nations for help. . . . It is ap-
parent that what he really means by looking to the United Nations for
help is looking to the imperialists for help. The facts show that the
United Nations, which is still under the control of the imperialists,
can only defend and strengthen the rule of colonialism but can never
abolish it.2°7
Communist China's position has been no less extreme on disarmament
questions. 20 8  In 1964 it refused participation in the Geneva talks and in
206 "Though (the Asian, African and Latin American countries) form a majority in
(the United Nations), these countries cannot fully exercise their legitimate rights,
and their proposals and demands are usually ignored or only perfunctorily discussed.
Even when resolutions against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism are adopted
at their insistence, their drafts are invariably watered down or amended by the United
States and its partners before they are approved. Anti-colonialist resolutions adopted
after hard struggle are invariably pigeonholed." 42 Peking Review 10, Oct. 15, 1965.
See also People's Daily, Feb. 4, 1964, in 3156 SCMP 17-18 (1964); but of. 21
Peking Review 22 (May 22, 1964), one of the few occasions when the Communist
Chinese press cited with approval actions in the U.N. Decolonization Committee.
207"A Great Victory for Leninism," Red Flag, April, 1965, in 19 Peking Review
7, 9, 10; "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism," Polemic, note 164 above, 196, 197.
See also a Nov. 28, 1963, speech by Liao Cheng-chih, in 49 Peking Review 12 (Dec.
6, 1963): "To advocate the bestowing of independence by the U.N .... would simply
mean liquidating the national-independence movement and helping U. S. imperialism
in advancing its neo-colonialist policy." (p. 15); Red Flag, "What the Congolese
Situation Shows," March 1, 1962, in 306 SCMM 7 (1962); People's Daily, "People
of the Congo (Leopoldville), Flight on", May 6, 1964, in 20 Peking Review 14 (May
15, 1964).
Communist China has shown itself admirably informed about the activities of the
Committees of 16 and 21. Of. 21 ibid. 22 (May 22, 1964).
2081. .. universal and complete disarmament can be realized only after imperialism,
capitalism and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated." "Statement by the
Spokesman of the Chinese Government . . ." Sept. 1, 1963, in Griffith, note 164
above, at 371, 386. "It is wrong to consider general and complete disarmament the
'overriding task' of the world peace movement." 50 Peking Review 14 (Dec. 13,
1963).
See, generally, Adams, note 166 above; Chiu, "Communist China's Attitude Towards
Nuclear Tests," 21 China Quarterly 96 (1965); Halperin and Perkins, note 162 above.
However dramatic the statements of recent vintage, Peking's attitude has a long-
standing base. Adams, note 166 above, writes thus of the period from 1957-1960:
"Peking evidenced little interest in this period in the Soviet concern about surprise
attack, and was pointedly dubious about the possible accomplishments of an experts'
meeting on the subject. Nor was Peking any more favorable to the convening of an
experts' conference on the problem of detecting test ban violations." (p. 236.)
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the Summit talks suggested by the Secretary General; 209 in 1965 it criti-
cized a General Assembly proposal for participation in world-wide dis-
armament talks."" On more than one occasion it has called the United
Nations "completely incapable of handling the disarmament question."1
211
It was not that Communist China was not a participant in the United
Nations. The United Nations was manipulated by the United States, and
the United States had no intention of disarming. Communist China's own
disarmament proposals are absurd on their face, 212 and, unlike the Soviet
209,The Geneva 18-nation disarmament conference is in fact still under the manip-
ulation and control of the United States and can in no way reflect the aspirations
of the peoples .... We thank the U. S. Government for its generosity in not opposing
China's participation in the Geneva disarmament conference but we must tell it
frankly that it will not have the pleasure of our company." People's Daily, Nov. 22,
1964, in 48 Peking Review 14 (Nov. 27, 1964).
Of U Thant's proposal, the People's Daily wrote: "So-called talks among countries
possessing nuclear weapons would in fact be a nuclear club in disguise. We will not
join such a club even if an invitation is sent us together with a sedan chair." Ibid.
Contrast these statements with an earlier policy position: ". . . it must be pointed
out that any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal
participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of her delegate, can-
not, of course, have any binding force on China." Resolution of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee, in 4 Peking Review 19 (Jan. 26, 1960).
0 New York Times, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 7.
211 People's Daily, " I New Starting for Efforts to Ban Nuclear Weapons Completely,"
Nov. 22, 1964, in 48 Peking Review 12, 14 (Nov. 27, 1964); see also 4 ibid. 14 (Jan. 22,
1965).
222 The latest comprehensive Communist Chinese proposal reads thus:
(1) All countries in the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, solemnly declare that
they will prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and
resolutely. Concretely speaking, they will not use nuclear weapons, nor export, nor
import, nor manufacture, nor test, nor stockpile them; and they will destroy all the
existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the world, and disband all
the existing establishments for the research, testing, and manufacture of nuclear
weapons in the world.
(2) In order to fulfill the above undertakings step by step, the following measures
shall be adopted first:
a. Dismantle all military bases, including nuclear bases on foreign soil, and with-
draw from abroad all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
b. Establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone of the Asian and Pacific region, including
the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of
Central Europe; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Africa; and a nuclear-weapon-free zone
of Latin America. The countries possessing nuclear weapons shall undertake due
obligations with regard to each of the nuclear-weapon-free zones.
c. Refrain from exporting and importing in any form nuclear weapons and technical
data for their manufacture.
d. Cease all nuclear tests, including underground nuclear tests.
(3) A conference of the Government heads of all the countries of the world shall
be convened to discuss the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons and the question of taking the above-mentioned four measures in
order to realize step by step the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons.
Halperin, note 3 above, believes "these proposals are not meant to be negoti-
able. . . . (p. 67.)
After its first nuclear test, Communist China made an apparently "1new" proposal:
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Union's proposals,2 13 they deny the United Nations any important r8le
in the disarmament process.2 14  Communist China vehemently attacked
the 1963 Test Ban Treaty; 21- its actions here suggest that its participation
in future disarmament conferences may significantly obstruct opportunities
for limited Soviet-United States agreement on arms control.210 In marked
disregard of numerous U.N. resolutions, Communist China has proclaimed
itself willing to transmit nuclear weapons information to other Socialist
countries, and possibly to countries in the Afro-Asian bloc.
2 17
During the Korean conflict,218 and with mounting intensity since 1956,219
Communist China has also maligned major U.N. attempts to maintain
minimum order.2 20  It has often opposed dispute settlement under inter-
"the nuclear powers (should) undertake not to use nuclear weapons .... "1 People's
Daily, Nov. 22, 1964, in 48 Peking Review 12 (Nov. 27, 1964). This was to be a com-
mitment unqualified by traditional doctrines of self-defense; from it, according to the
People's Daily, would follow ineluctably the end of nuclear testing and the cessation
of nuclear production. Ibid. at 13. Note that in early 1960 the Chinese opposed a
proposed Soviet troop reduction. Zagoria, note 164 above, at 292.
213 See World Law Fund, Current Disarmament Proposals 1 (1964).
214 See, e.g., 291 SCMM 42 (Dee. 11, 1961). The MeCloy-Zorin Agreement of 1961
called for an "international disarmament organization ... within the framework of
the United Nations." Its inspectors "should be assured unrestricted access without
veto to all places, as necessary for the purposes of effective verification." Joint State-
ment of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of the Soviet Union and
the United States, Sept. 20, 1961, in World Law Fund, note 213 above, at 189, 191.
2195Major Chinese and Soviet documents are collected in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet
Rift at 326, 331, 340, 371 (1964); see also Griffith's text at 159-166; Chiu, note 208
above, at 102-106.
216 At the China Arms Control Conference (July 9-19, 1964, Airlie House, Warren-
ton, Virginia), the participants, including both China specialists and disarmament
experts, were in virtual agreement that Communist China would not conclude an arms
control agreement "-within the next five or ten years." Halperin and Perkins, note
162 above, at 155. See also Chin, note 208 above, at 107.
217 "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government," Aug. 15, 1963, in
33 Peking Review 7, 12 (Aug. 16, 1963). See also 32 ibid. 16, 17 (Aug. 7, 1964).
In his press conference of Sept. 29, 1965, Chen Yi had this to say of Peking's
attitude toward nuclear proliferation:
"As for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the building of atomic reactors, China
has already been approached by several countries, and China is ready to render them
assistance .... China hopes that Afro-Asian countries will be able to make atom bombs
themselves, and it would be better for a greater number of countries to come into
possession of atom bombs." 41 ibid. 7, 8 (Oct. 8, 1965).
Communist China has chided the Soviet Union for its apparent interest in a "1non-
proliferation" agreement (of. People's Daily, "The Soviet Government Once Again
Exposes Itself," Jan. 30, 1966, in 6 Peking Review 14 (Feb. 4, 1966)), and has
criticized Khrushchev for over-estimating the possibilities of accidental war (20 ibid.
18 (May 14, 1965)).
21s Cf., e.g., Whiting, note 181 above, at 80-87, 99-101, 139-143.
219 See, generally, Adams, note 166 above.
220Liao Cheng-chih, one of Peking's foreign policy planners, has recently stated:
"The flag of the United Nations is dripping with the blood of the peoples of Asia
and Africa. Manipulated by the United States, the United Nations has become a
tool of U. S. imperialism for undermining and suppressing the national-liberation
movements in Asia, Africa and Latin-America. And now, through the instrumentality
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national auspices, whether by discussion, 22 ' mediation, 22 observation, 23
investigation,2 4 arbitration or judicial decision.225  Invariably Communist
of the so-called U.N. 'special Committee for Peace-Keeping Operations,' the U. S.
imperialists and their partners are plotting to set up a permanent U.N. force to sup-
press the national-liberation movements. We Afro-Asian peoples shall never tolerate
the use of the United Nations by U. S. imperialism and its accomplices for their dirty
deeds." 21 Peking Review 15 (May 21, 1965).
22'1"We favour negotiations with imperialist countries. But it is absolutely im-
permissible to pin hopes for world peace on negotiations, spread illusions about them
and thereby paralyze the fighting will of the peoples, as Khrushchev has done." Edi-
torial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, "Two Different Lines on
the Question of War and Peace," Polemic, note 164 above, at 221, 253.
In the following situations, the Communist Chinese protested proposals for or at-
tempts at U.N. discussion of critical international issues:
Viet-Nam, July-August, 1965: 33 Peking Review 8-10 (Aug. 13, 1965).
Viet-Nam, January-February, 1965: 7 ibid. 19, 20 (Feb. 12, 1965).
Viet-Nam, Fall, 1964: Liu Ning-i, "The Militant Unity of China and Viet-
nam," in 49 ibid. 26, 28 (Dee. 4, 1964).
Viet-Nam, Summer, 1964: C.P.C.C.C. Reply to the C.P.S.U.C.C. letter of July 30,
1964, in 36 Peking Review 6 (Sept. 4, 1964). (The C.P.S.U., wrote the Communist
Chinese, had "aided and abetted the aggressor by actively supporting the U. S.
attempt to intervene in Viet-Nam through the United Nations." Ibid. 7.)
Malaysia, Summer, 1964: 37 Peking Review 8 (Sept. 11, 1964).
Dominican Republic, Spring, 1964: Statement of the Government of the People's
Republic of China, May 3, 1964, in 19 ibid. 12 (May 7, 1964).
222 On the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir in September, 1965: "The so-called
mediation by the United Nations is based on a report of the Secretary-General. The
report itself is unfair. . . . On the Kashmir question, the United Nations has once
again proved a tool of U. S. imperialists and their partners in their attempt to
control the whole world." "Chinese Government Statement," Sept. 7, 1965, in 37
Peking Review 6 (Sept. 10, 1965). See also People's Daily, "U.N.--Sanctuary for the
Indian Aggressor," Sept. 14, 1965, in 38 ibid. 14 (Sept. 17, 1965).
Of the Security Council action, the Communist Chinese wrote: ".. . (t)he U. S.
Government instructed its representative to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg
to get on the move and collaborate with the Soviet Union in manipulating the Security
Council to pass two resolutions for the purpose of intervention. Both resolutions
distorted the facts . . ." People's Daily, "Who Backs the Indian Aggressors?",
Sept. 18, 1965, in 39 ibid. 13 (Sept. 24, 1965).
223 Cambodia-Viet-Nam border, May, 1964: opposed a U. S. proposal to send U.N.
observers to investigate Cambodian charges that South Viet-Nam forces had entered
Cambodian territory. People's Daily, "U. S. Imperialism Must Not Be Allowed to
Lead the U.N. Into Indo-China," May 25, 1964, in 22 Peking Review 8 (May 29, 1964).
Cuba, Fall, 1962: opposed U.N. supervision of missile withdrawal from Cuba. Edi-
torial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, "Why Khrushchov Fell,"
Polemic, note 164 above, at 481, 485.
224Communist China has opposed proposals for U.N. "fact-finding" missions in-
at the very least-the following situations:
1. Dominican Republic, Spring, 1965: 21 Peking Review 33 (May 21, 1965);
2. Viet-Nam, Fall, 1963: 42 ibid. 25 (Oct. 18, 1963);
3. Malaysia, 1963-1964: 3 ibid. 14 (Jan. 15, 1965); People's Daily "Oppose
Malaysia-A Product of Neo-Colonialism, Support the Struggle of the North Kaliman-
tan People," in 14 ibid. 28 (April 3, 1964);
4. Cuba, Fall, 1962: Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag,
"The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU
and Ourselves," in Polemic, note 164 above, 55, 96;
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China has been sharply critical of all United Nations "police force" ac-
tivities,228 whatever their composition.227  It has suspected the UN-EF, 22 s
denounced the ONUC, 229 and attacked the Yugoslavs for contributing
troops to the Congo operation.2 0 It has even chastized the Russians for
their proposed "voluntary" "assessments" contributions, 23 ' and for their
participation in the U.N. Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations:
Particularly grave is Soviet active support for the setting up of a
permanent armed force of the United Nations. This means becoming
a partner in organizing an international gendarmerie in the service
of U.S. imperialism for the suppression of the revolutionary struggles
of the peoples of the world. . . . It is absolutely clear that their so-
called "support for the national-liberation movement" is false while
5. Lebanon, Summer, 1958: labeled UNOGIL an "instrument of U. S. British inter-
vention, ' 1796 SOMP 42, June 20, 1958, quoted in Adams, note 166 above, at 68.
225 In 1963 the Indian Government proposed that the Sino-Indian border dispute be
arbitrated by the International Court of Justice or another arbitral body. The Com-
munist Chinese refused. See Note from the Foreign Ministry of the People's Re-
public of China, Oct. 9, 1963, in 42 Peking Review 9 (Oct. 18, 1963).
226 The Communist Chinese have opposed proposals for an international force in
the following situations:
Viet-Nam: an Indian proposal called for an Afro-Asian force to be sent to Viet-
Nam. 20 Peking Review 25 (May 14, 1965);
Laos: the Vice President of the Laotian National Assembly recommended that an
international force be stationed in Laos for 10 or 15 years. 23 ibid. 14 (June 5,
1964);
Viet-Nam: Britain's Prime Minister Wilson proposed an "international peace force"
for Viet-Nam. 28 ibid. 8 (July 9, 1965);
Cyprus: People's Daily, "Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action," Jan. 18, 1965,
in 3 ibid. 7, 8 (Jan. 15, 1965); see also 8 ibid. 16 (Feb. 21, 1964).
Of. the Albanian Zerii Popullit article summarized in 17 ibid. 27 (April 23, 1965)
and entitled "Soviet-U. S. Plot to Establish an International Gendarmerie."
227 It made little difference to the Chinese Communists that ONUC was composed
in part of Asians and Africans. Of. People's Daily, Feb. 18, 1961, 2443 SOMP 32,
34. And the Communist Chinese have virulently attacked the Soviet Union for its rle
in the Congo conflict. See Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red
Flag, "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism," Polemic, note 164 above, 185, 199-200;
People's Daily, "People of the Congo (Leopoldville), Fight OnIl", May 6, 1964, in
20 Peking Review 14, 15 (May 15, 1964); Red Flag, "A Great Victory for Leninism,"
April, 1965, in 19 ibid. 7, 10 (May 7, 1965).
228 "The purpose of United States in supporting the Canadian proposal is obviously
to take over with the so-called emergency international force the areas in Egypt which
have been occupied by Britain, France and Israel unlawfully so as to realize the vile
scheme of depriving Egypt of its sacred sovereignty over Suez." Statement of the
Government of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 7, 1956, quoted in Adams, note
166 above, at 59.
229 For Communist Chinese appraisal of U.N. activities during 1964, see People's
Daily, "Hail the Triumphant Revolutionary Developments in the Congo (L)," June
24, 1965, in 27 Peking Review 15 (July 3, 1964); statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung,
Nov. 28, 1964, in 49 ibid. 5 (Dec. 4, 1965).
220Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, "Is Yugoslavia a
Socialist Country?", in Polemic, note 164 above, at 139. See especially pp. 162,
167-170.
23.Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, 9A Comment on
the March Moscow Meeting," in 13 Peking Review 7, 9 (March 26, 1965).
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their collusion with U.S. imperialism to strangle the national-liberation
movement is genuine. 2
32
Communist China's behavior in past multinational conferences, finally,
belies the possibility that it will act constructively at the United Nations.
23 3
It has caviled against having U.N. "observers" at several such confer-
ences,234 and, in the preparatory meetings for the Second Afro-Asian Con-
ference, 5 it opposed attempts to introduce the U.N. Rules of Procedure.2 3 6
In numerous multinational conferences, including inter-Communist Party-
congresses, Communist China has proclaimed its adherence to nineteenth-
century notions of sovereignty,2-7 and has resisted majority rule-even
on procedural issues.238  Six years ago the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China announced:
. . . where the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism are con-
cerned, the problem of exactly who is right and who is wrong cannot
23219 ibid. 10 (May 7, 1965). To the same effect, 20 ibid. 18 (May 14, 1965);
24 ibid. 16 (June 11, 1965); 25 ibid. 8 (June 18, 1965).
233 Communist China has sought to manipulate the membership and timing of inter-
national conferences to insure that the conferences produced preferred results. It has,
for example, attempted to exclude the Soviet Union from the Second Afro-Asian
Conference, principally on grounds that the Soviet Union was not an Asian state.
E.g, Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 30, 1964,
in 23 Peking Review 6 (June 5, 1964). It also was a prime mover for postponement
of the Second Afro-Asian Conference. Statement of the Government of the People's
Republic of China, "China Will Not Attend African-Asian Conference Which Leads
to a Split," Oct. 26, 1965, in 44 ibid. 5 (Oct. 29, 1965).
234 Communist China has formally protested against a UNECA representative at-
tending an Afro-Asian Economic Seminar held in Algeria Feb. 22-27, 1965 (11 Peking
Review 18 (March 12, 1965)), and against U Thant attending the Second Afro-Asian
Conference (Chen Yi, Press Conference of Sept. 29, 1965, in 41 ibid. 7, 10 (Oct. 8,
1965)).
235 Of. Chen Yi, speech at the Second Asian-African Conference Preparatory Meet-
ing, April 11, 1964, in 16 ibid. 6, 8 (April 17, 1964).
236Cheng, "Anti-Imperialism: Keynote of the Second African-Asian Conference,"
in 26 ibid. 5, 6 (June 25, 1965).
237 "The Chinese formula is 'unanimity through consultation' .... The Com-
munist Party of China did not accept Khrushchev's demand for majority rule at
international conferences. The CPC's insistence on unanimity, which so far has neither
been officially endorsed nor officially rejected by the (Communist) movement as a
whole, obviously represents a claim to a veto for itself . . . and for the right to form
and lead 'fractions' (combinations) within the international Communist movement."
Hinton, note 174 above, at 98-99.
238E.g., World Council of Peace, Nov. 28, 1963, described by Liao Cheng-ehih in
49 Peking Review 12, 15 (Dee. 6, 1963). The Chinese Communists, often finding them-
selves in a minority position, have sought "unanimity through consultation" at trans-
national conferences. E.g.:
(1) Various Communist Party Conferences; of. Editorial Departments of the People's
Daily and Red Flag, "Why Khrushchov Fell," Polemic, note 164 above, at 481, 488.
(2) Sixth World Trade Union Congress (Warsaw, Oct. 9-22, 1965); of. 44 Peking
Review 15 (Oct. 29, 1965).
(3) The Second African-Asian Conference; cf. People's Daily, "Keep Up Efforts
for Success of Second African-Asian Conference," June 29, 1965, in 27 Peking
Review 6 (July 2, 1965); Chen Yi, speech of April 17, 1964, quoted in 25 ibid. 18
(June 18, 1965).
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in every case be judged by who has the majority. After all truth is
truth. Error cannot be turned into truth because of a temporary
majority, nor will truth be turned into error because of a temporary
minority.239
3. Nationalist China as a "New" Entity
Though exhibiting many elements of continuity in authority, both in-
ternal and external, with the "Republic of China" which became an
original Member of the United Nations, Nationalist China has of course
undergone many changes in effective control. It is enough for present
purposes selectively to compare the approximate resources and production
of pre-1949 and post-1949 Nationalist China: 240
Resource Pre-1949 1'ost-1949
Land (sq. mil.) 9,761,012 13,884
Population 582,603,417 11,883,523
Coal (million metric tons) 440,000 737
Iron Ore (million tons) 1,200 almost negligible
Arable Land (million acres) 240 7
Yearly Production Pre-1949 Post-1949
Coal (thousand tons) 61,875 2,700
Power (m.kwh.) 5,955 6,000
Pig Iron (thousand tons) 1,801 negligible
Cement (thousand tons) 2,293 negligible
C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGE FOR PARTICIPATION PRODLEMS
To distill the critical elements from this extraordinarily complex factual
situation, and to trace their legal consequences as we apply past trends
in the articulation of fundamental community policies, it is essential to
distinguish sharply between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese claims
to participate in (1) the General Assembly and (2) the Security Council.
It is equally important to determine (a) the decision-maker (the Security
Council, the General Assembly, or both) which will pass on both sets of
claims, (b) the criteria that will guide decision, (c) the procedures for
arriving at decision, and (d) the timing of decisions on the four claims.
At the outset we should make clear that there are no past trends whose
policies would govern either the Communist Chinese or the Nationalist
Chinese claim to participate in the Security Council. Decision here must
look to the basic constitutional framework of the United Nations and the
major purposes of the United Nations Charter. Past initial participation
289Quoted in Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, "The
Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," Polemic, note 164
above, at 303, 337. A principal issue in the Sino-Soviet rift has been Chinese un-
willingness to accept either Soviet leadership or majority decision. See Dallin,
Diversity in International Communism xxix (1963).
240 This chart is principally derived from the following sources: Hsieh, Talwan-Ilha
Formosa: A Geography in Perspective (1964); Rlostow et a?., The Prospects for Com-
munist China (1954); Mancall, Formosa Today (1964); U. S. Bureau of Foreign
Commerce, Far Eastern Division, Investment in Talwan (Formosa): Basic Information
for United States Businessmen (1959).
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decisions for the General Assembly, conversely, are numerous and range
along a broad continuum. At the one extreme the Assembly has solved
initial participation questions by the methods of informal consensus. At
the other, it has turned to the explicit criteria and rigorous procedures of
the Charter's Article 4. One of our present tasks is to locate along this
continuum the Nationalist and Communist Chinese claims to participate
in the Assembly.
1. The Conn z ist Chinese Claim to Participate in the General Assembly
The Communist Chinese claim to participate in the General Assembly is
not likely to be accepted by informal consensus, and is scarcely governed
by the policies of the Cuban, Polish or Czechoslovakian cases.241  Myopic
application of these cases, which, indeed, were not articulated decisions at
all, would mean that the Communist Chinese would sit in the General
Assembly without formal vote on their claim to participation. Even the
most ardent supporters of the Communist Chinese claims have expected
that at least a simple majority would be required to seat the Communist
Chinese.
United Nations history aside, there are more important distinctions be-
tween the Communist Chinese claim and the past Cuban, Polish and Czech
decisions. Change in mainland China has been more drastic. In politi-
cal orientation, it has swung from the far right of the free world to the
extreme left of the Communist bloc; the Poles and Czechs started from a
different base, and they, together with the Cubans,24 2 have adopted gen-
erally a pro-Soviet attitude in the Sino-Soviet controversy.24  Communist
China clearly has the capacity, and has demonstrated its willingness, to
subvert the principles of the Charter. Neither element was so apparent
in the three other decisions. The earlier decisions, finally, did not promise
the extraordinary impacts that a decision on the Communist Chinese claims
is almost certain to have. They could not have ousted from the General
Assembly a territorial community which has demonstrated its willingness
to assume the obligations of the Charter.
By this point it should be clear that the Chinese participation question
is not exclusively an initial participation question. It is something more-
a question of infinitely greater consequence than the vast majority of so-
called "membership" decisions. In the Chinese participation question,
two territorial communities each seek a single "Member's" General As-
sembly and Security Council seats. Past initial participation questions
posit neither choice between such claimants nor allocation of a Security
Council seat; instead they assume that one claimant seeks a single seat
in the General Assembly. A General Assembly decision on Chinese par-
ticipation claims may affect the distribution of "China's" seat in both
the Security Council and the Specialized Agencies. Assembly resolutions
241Delegates' credentials went unchallenged after the pertinent post-World-War-fl
revolutions. See test above, at notes 103-105.
242Indeed, it was not until the spring of 1963 that Cuba was thought to be a
"socialist country" by members of the Communist bloc.
243See Griffith, op. cit. note 215 above.
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on "membership" questions, on the other hand, have a past notable for
their inability to determine Council action.2  The Chinese participation
question threatens lack of uniformity in seating the "Chinese" delegation
in both the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. No past initial
participation question has so entangled the United Nations. As commonly
formulated, the Chinese participation question promises, finally, either
that one territorial community will yearly be kept outside the United
Nations, or that the other will be perpetually excluded from the Or-
ganization. How unlike the genuine "membership" decisions, which in-
variably seek to increase responsible participation in the United Nations.
(a) The Decision-Maker.-Although the Security Council was the
first to pass on the Chinese participation question, for the past fourteen
years it has been virtually assumed that the General Assembly would be
principally responsible for deciding on the Nationalist and Communist
claims to sit both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council.
In corollary fashion, it has also been assumed that the Security Council
would have no r6le in a decision to seat either claimant in the General As-
sembly. Both assumptions rest on two propositions: (1) it has been
politically expedient for both the Soviet Union and the United States to
keep debate on the Chinese participation question confined to the General
Assembly; and (2) "in virtue of (the Assembly's) composition . .. con-
sideration can best be given to views of all Member States in matters af-
fecting the functioning of the Organization as a whole. .... ,, 245
The Soviet and U. S. tactical maneuvers have little basis in either law
or community policy. Presumably the Soviet Union has chosen not to
confer "Great Power" (i.e., Security Council) status on initially a po-
tential, and then an actual, competitor within the Communist bloc. Cer-
tainly it might not have been wise tactics for the Soviets to risk a Council
ruling that decision on the Chinese participation question is vetoable.
The United States simply has never viewed the question comprehensively,
and has proceeded along lines of least effort.
It is, moreover, at the very least questionable to assert primary As-
sembly competence on grounds of Assembly "universality." The legal
consequences of General Assembly Resolution 396 (V), the prime authori-
tative source of Assembly competence, are far from clear. It is relevant
that each United Nations organ subscribes to the principle of auto-inter-
pretation, that Assembly Resolution 396 (V) is only "recommendatory,"
and that an Assembly decision on the Chinese participation question is
only to be "taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and
in the Specialized Agencies." The Security Council itself has passed on
the Chinese participation question. It, further, undercut the rationale of
primary Assembly competence when that body rejected an amendment to
its Rules of Procedure which would have required the President of the
244B.g., U. W. General Assembly Resolutions 35 (I); 113 (II); 197 (II); 296 (IV);
450 (VI); 620 (VII).
245 U.N. General Assembly Res. 396 (V).
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Council to ascertain the views of all U.N. Members before the Council
decided a "representation" question.
246
Indeed, it borders on the unconstitutional for the General Assembly to
be principally responsible for decision on the Chinese participation ques-
tion. Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Charter require prior Security Council
approval for the admission of a "new" Member or the suspension or ex-
pulsion of a current Member. Prior Security Council approval was a
principle accepted at Dumbarton Oaks, and only weakly challenged at San
Francisco.2 47  Its major purpose was to insure that the Council, which
was to be primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace
and security, would have a controlling voice in determining whether
potential or actual Members would fulfill, or were fulfilling, their Charter
obligations. Since (absent a comprehensive settlement) seating Com-
munist China in the General Assembly will have all the important opera-
tional effects of "admission" and "expulsion," prior Security Council
approval would appear a constitutional prerequisite to decision on Com-
munist China's claim to Assembly participation. Entrusting the General
Assembly with principal responsibility -would thwart one of the major
purposes of Articles 4, 5 and 6.
Thus it would appear sound constitutional policy for a Security Council
decision to precede Assembly action on Communist China's claim to
participate in the Assembly. In this way, both the "responsible" and
the "universal" United Nations organs could bring their special com-
petences to solution of the question. Most importantly, this procedure
would minimize a potential lack of uniformity in the seating of "China's"
delegations within the United Nations. To give the General Assembly
principal responsibility for settling the Chinese participation question
would be almost to guarantee that different "Chinese" delegations will sit
in different organs of the United Nations.
(b) Criteria for decision
(1) In the Security Council.-The Chinese participation question is
so much more consequential in impact than past initial participation
questions that, at the very least, the modest "membership" criteria of
Article 4 should govern decision on the Communist Chinese claim to par-
ticipate in the General Assembly. Absent a comprehensive settlement,
246 Security Council, 5th Year, Official Records, Jan.-uMay Supp. 16-18 (U.N. Doe.
S/1457 and Corr. 1) (1950).
247 Admission is, under Art. 4 (2) of the Charter, "effected by a decision of the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." Goodrich and
Hambro, after a survey of both the Dumbarton Oaks and the San lFrancisco travaux,
conclude that "(t)here is nothing to indicate that the delegates did not intend to
make a favorable recommendation by the Security Council a necessary condition to
admission by vote of the General Assembly." Charter of the United Nations: Com-
mentary and Documents 135 (rev. ed., 1949). Their conclusion is borne out by the
subsequent practice of the relevant organs. In the first session of the General As-
sembly, Australia proposed that the Assembly "has primary and final responsibility
in the process of admission." (U.N. Does. A/C.1/23/Rev. 1 and A/C.1/23/Corr. 1.)
Neither this nor a similar Argentinian proposal was accepted. Goodrich and Hambro,
op. cit. at 136. A similar proposal, made by the United States in the Security Council
in 1947, was also not accepted. U.N. Doe. S/P.V. 190.
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past trends in decision would suggest that the Council should decide not
to seat the Communist Chinese delegation. For guidance in decision, it
could make no difference whether the Council looked to the stated re-
quirements of Article 4, or instead focused on the content which Article 4
has acquired in practice. If the former is considered, the Council could
reject the Communist Chinese on grounds that they are neither "peace-
loving" nor "willing . . . to fulfill the obligations of the Charter."
If the latter, it could refrain from seating the Communist Chinese because
they are demonstrably unwilling to fulfill their international obligations
to all the camps in the bi- or tri-polar world.
(2) In the General Assembly.-Article 4 criteria, interpreted in ac-
cordance with the recommendations above, should similarly guide General
Assembly decision on the Communist Chinese claim for Assembly par-
ticipation.
(c) Procedures for decision
(1) In the Security Counil.-Past trends, when coupled with the
history of the Chinese participation question, demonstrate also that a
Council decision on the Communist Chinese claims for Assembly partici-
pation is not a decision on a "procedural matter," and is subject to the
veto. The purposes and practice of Article 4 reinforce this conclusion:
Communist China is a "new" entity for purposes of participation in the
General Assembly, its perspectives and operations promise violation of
Charter principles, and its claim is thus vetoable. Absent a comprehensive
settlement, Article 6 dictates a similar result.
(2) In the General Assembly.-Past trends in decision would appear
to also require that the General Assembly vote on the Communist Chinese
claim to participation be by a two-thirds special majority. For the past
four years the Chinese participation question has been regarded as "im-
portant" for voting purposes and thus subject to special majority approval
in the Assembly. It would be irrational for the next Assembly to label
the issue "not important" when the consequences of decision remain un-
changed, the factual situation is unaltered, and the Communist Chinese
have made more explicit their challenge to the Organization. Article 18
of the Charter, further, requires the Assembly to vote by a two-thirds
majority when it admits new Members to the Organization, elects non-
permanent members of the Council, suspends the rights and privileges of
membership, and expels Members from the Organization. The Chinese
participation question, as usually conceived, could have all four of these
consequences. Seating Communist China in the Assembly would have all
the significant operational effects of admitting a new Member. Upholding
the Communist Chinese claim in the Assembly might importantly affect
the seating rights of a permanent member of the Security Council-a
matter of perhaps more consequence than the election of a non-permanent
member of the Council. Seating Communist China in the General As-
sembly, finally, might end in the suspension or expulsion of Nationalist
China. If each of the Article 18 decisions alone requires a special ma-
jority, it follows a fortiori that the Chinese participation question, which
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combines all four in a single decision, is "important" under Article 18
for voting purposes.
2. The Nationalist Chinese Claim to Participate in the General Assembly
Nationalist China's claim to participate in the General Assembly falls,
at the very least, within the 1961 Assembly decision to seat Syria after
dissolution of the U.A.R.24 Just as in the Syria case, there is no question
of Nationalist China's dedication to Charter principles. The procedures
and criteria of informal consensus, therefore, should govern Nationalist
China's claim to Assembly participation, whether it sits as "China" or
under some other label.
3. Communist Chin a's Claim to Participate in the Security Council
(a) Criteria for decision.-The criteria for participation as a perma-
nent member in the Security Council are found, not in specific Charter
articles or in United Nations practice, but in deliberations prior to and at
the San Francisco Conference, and in the policies sought to be achieved
by the United Nations Charter. At San Francisco, the Security Council
was delegated "primary responsibility" for maintaining international
peace and security.24 9 Its permanent members had co-operated success-
fully in restoring minimum order after World War II, and it was hoped
that they would jointly halt aggression in the postwar world. It was not
enough, in the words of Article 4, that the permanent members were "able
and willing to carry out (their general Charter) obligations." They were
to be capable of co-operating, and willing to co-operate, in fulfilling the
Council's primary purpose, namely, the maintenance of international peace
and security.
To effectuate the purposes of the Charter-framers, similar criteria
should guide decision on the Communist Chinese claim for Security Council
participation. Communist China is certainly a "new" entity for pur-
poses of participating as a permanent member on the Council. Since its
past behavior belies a willingness to co-operate in safeguarding minimum
order, and, indeed, promises severe disruption of Council activities, the
Council should reject the Communist Chinese claim.
(b) Procedures for decision.-Past trends would require that the
Chinese participation question be regarded as "substantive" for voting
purposes in the Security Council. In Article 4 practice, permanent mem-
bers have had a veto over applications for membership in the General
Assembly. How much more substantive is a claim by a "new" entity
for participation in the Security Council, particularly when that "new"
entity has virtually proven its willingness to obstruct Council actions to
maintain minimum order.
Article 6 of the Charter, further, reads as follows:
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the
Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the
248See text above at p. 691. 249 U. N. Charter, Art. 24(1).
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Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council.
It would be extreme irrationality to expel from the Organization a terri-
torial community which, as a permanent member of the Council, has con-
sistently upheld Charter principles, and to seat in its place an entity,
"new" for United Nations membership purposes, whose past actions
promise behavior that will persistently violate the Principles of the Charter.
A Council decision on the Chinese participation question thus is of con-
siderably more consequence than Council decisions on past initial partici-
pation questions, and is, a fortiori, a decision requiring the concurring
votes of all the permanent members of the Council.
4. Nationalist China's Claim to Participate in the Security Council
Capacity and willingness to promote maximum order are the two im-
portant criteria for guiding decision on Nationalist China's claim to
participate in the Security Council. We would note that the Nationalist
Chinese have capability, as indicated in one of the larger and better
equipped military establishments in Asia, and willingness, as demonstrated
by past support for United Nations action. In the absence of a new com-
prehensive solution, a presumption might be indulged-as it has been-
in favor of continuity of authority.
5. The Timing of Decision
Of all the issues in the Chinese participation question, there is none
more complex than the timing of decision. Within the United Nations
itself, the General Assembly and the Security Council must decide on four
separate claims. Yet there are no established procedures which would
require simultaneous presentation of these claims, and there is absolutely
no assurance that the responsible organs will reach congruent decision at
the same time. Disparity in seating "China's" delegations may be the
inevitable result.
Given these procedural ambiguities, the power alignments of both
claimants, and the possibility that Nationalist China could be permanently
excluded from the United Nations, past experience might suggest that the
Chinese participation question be settled by a variation of the "package
deal." If both claimants were to apply to become "new" Members in the
Assembly, it is certain that their applications would be traded one against
the other. How much more important are prior negotiations when two
claimants, each aligning with opposing poles in the bi- or tri-polar world,
seek seats both in the Assembly and in the Security Council.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Past trends in practice, the values at stake, and the disasters certain to
ensue from unthinking resort to current procedures, all demand that the
Chinese participation question be settled by advance negotiations. We
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would recommend that a fifteen to twenty-member group,250 with delegates
from the two Chinese claimants sitting -without vote in advisory capacity,251
frame solutions to the problem, which should be submitted both to the
General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Specialized Agencies.
The General Assembly vote "approving" a particular solution should be by
two-thirds majority. The Security Council vote should be "substantive,"
and the permanent members of the Council, except perhaps for Nationalist
China as a party in interest, should retain their veto. The Specialized
Agencies should approve the plan by special majority. If the solution
should call for Charter amendment, Members should deposit their ratifica-
tions with all possible speed.
Any particular solution might simply reallocate "China's" present
seats, or create "new" participation rights in the United Nations,252 or
tie a decision on the participation question in with a general political
settlement.253  One "reallocation" plan might place Communist China in
250 The group should consist of the permanent members of the Security Council
other than China, and Members representative of the major voting blocs in the United
Nations. All Members of the United Nations should be entitled to submit solutions to
the Chinese participation question, and to comment in writing on solutions being con-
sidered by the group. We recommend that the group generally hold public meetings;
yet we note that it may be advisable for the group to iron out the intricacies of par-
ticular plans in private sessions.
251 The two Chinese claimants should be entitled to submit proposals themselves for
solving the Chinese participation question, and should have rights to comment on and
criticize proposals submitted to the committee.
It is not inconceivable that either or both of the Chinese claimants would refuse to
participate in the 15-to-20 group which we recommend. Given the novelty of the
Chinese participation question, we would suggest, in these circumstances, that a refusal
to participate in the discussions be regarded as an unwillingness to fulfill one's inter-
national obligations.
252This is a proposal not unknown in the history of international organization.
Prior to Germany's admission to the League as a permanent member of the Council in
1926, Poland, Brazil, Spain, China and Belgium all claimed permanent membership in
the Council. Eventually, the Assembly's First Committee proposed a plan which
created a new form of "semi-permanent" membership. In principle non-permanent
members of the League Council could not be re-elected after their term expired. The
First Committee's proposal relaxed this rule, and permitted the Assembly, by a two-
thirds majority vote, to declare not more than three states "re-eligible" for Council
membership. No limit was placed on the number of times a state might be re-elected.
Presumably Poland, Spain and Brazil would qualify for 're-eligibility," and thus
would assume a position in the League intermediate between the Great Powers and
the rank and file of League Members. See, generally, League of Nations Official
Journal, 7th (Ordinary) Assembly, Spec. Supp. 45 (1926); and Walters, A History
of the League of Nations 316-327 (1952).
When Georgia and Armenia submitted applications for League membership, they
were permitted to take part in the social and economic activities of the League, even
though their applications were not approved.
253 This proposal, too, is not without precedent in the history of international or-
ganization. When Abyssinia, and later Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, applied for
League membership, they were seated only after appropriate declarations-in the
former case to eliminate slavery and traffic in arms, and in the latter three, to adhere
to the provisions of the Minorities Treaties. See, generally, Hudson, "The Members
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the Security Council and General Assembly and seat Nationalist China
(as "Taiwan") in the General Assembly.214 Another plan might leave
vacant the "Chinese" seat on the Security Council, 2 5 or grant that seat
to a responsible representative of the African, Asian, and Latin American
nations.256 "New" participation rights for the Security Council might
include permanent participation without the veto, participation terminable
on special majority vote by the General Assembly, or participation only
on issues affecting peace and security in Asia. "New" forms of General
Assembly membership could permit participation in Assembly debate
without the right to vote, participation only on selected issues, or partici-
pation with special rights to election to the Security Council as a non-
permanent member. 27 Terms of a related political settlement 2 8 might
include, in illustration of the kinds of relevant commitment, such items
as the following:
(1) Mutual renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits;
(2) Communist Chinese guarantee of the independence of Taiwan
indefinitely or for a specified number of years;
(3) Settlement of the Sino-Indian border controversy by an inter-
national arbitral body, and/or creation of an international
force, financed by Communist China and India, which would
patrol the Sino-Indian border (or other borders thought neces-
sary) which adjoin China;
(4) Communist Chinese guarantee that it will not support revolu-
tionary parties in the less-developed countries;
(5) Sanctions--diplomatic, cultural, economic and military-which
the international community would apply on violation of a re-
lated political settlement.
of the League of Nations," 16 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 130 (1935), and Graham, The
League of Nations and the Recognition of States (1933).
254 Cf. the Dec. 8th, 1964, speech by Ireland's Foreign Minister Aiken to the Gen-
eral Assembly. New York Times, Dec. 9, 1964, p. 6, col. 3.
255 The vacancy might be only temporary, and Communist China might be seated
as a permanent member once it gave evidence that its perspectives and operations
were consonant with the principles and purposes of the Charter.
255 India has been suggested. E.g. Wilcox and Marcy, Proposals for Changes in the
United Nations 307 (1955).
257 .g., prior to 1955, Italy participated in deliberations of the Trusteeship Council
without being a Member of the UTN. Although it was without the vote when either
Somalia or general trusteeship problems were discussed, Italy could (1) include items
in the agenda, (2) request special sessions of the Trusteeship Council, (3) submit draft
resolutions and propose other motions or amendments without a second, and (4)
append its views to the reports or recommendations of the Trusteeship Council. Italy,
moreover, had access to the private meetings of the Council, and it was to be notified
of the first meeting of each session of the Trusteeship Council and of the provisional
agenda. Italy, however, was not permitted to participate in the work of the subsidiary
organs of the Council. Trusteeship Council Res. 310 (VII) entitled "Question of
the Full Participation of Italy in the Work of the Trusteeship Council."
2 8 For an earlier and still relevant projection and evaluation of alternatives, see
Dean, "United States Foreign Policy and Formosa," 33 Foreign Affairs 360 (1955).
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We would recommend that the fifteen-to-twenty-nation "drafting" com-
mittee devise solutions to the Chinese participation question only after it
has comprehensively analyzed all the characteristics of the two claimants,
and only after it has related these characteristics to proposed rights of
participation in specific United Nations organs. The principles of uni-
versality and responsibility should be at the base of every proposed solu-
tion.2?' In particular, every plan should grant a seat on the Security
Council-in the United Nations system the organ of primary responsi-
bility for safeguarding international peace and security-only to a
claimant demonstrating both willingness and capability of promoting
maximum order. 2 0
259 See text above at p. 682.
250 It is obvious that Communist China could not, without substantial modification
of its foreign policy objectives, adhere to a "compromise" settlement designed by the
drafting committee, if the compromise permits separate representation for Taiwan in
the United Nations. This, however, should not preclude the drafting committee from
reaching such a compromise. It is for the world community to spell out the terms of
participation in the United Nations, and not for Communist China to dictate terms
to the United Nations. Rejection of the world community-approved settlement plan
would be a virtual demonstration that Communist China is unwilling to fulfill the terms
of the Charter.
We note that both France and the United Kingdom have employed variants of a
"two China" policy. Both countries have consulates in Taiwan; France has an am-
bassador, and the United Kingdom a chargd d'affaires in Communist China. Com-
munist China has, however, unceasingly rejected proposals for "compromise," par-
tieularly those in the form of a "two-Chinas" solution. Cf. Chen Ti, June 20, 1964,
Press Conference: People's Daily, "The Chinese People are Determined to Liberate
Taiwan," June 27, 1965, in 27 Peking Review 9 (July 2, 1965); Commentator, "Don't
Fall into the Imperialist Trap," People's Daily, July 9, 1964, in 29 ibid. 35 (July 17,
1964) (Malawi had invited representatives of both "Chinas" to its independence
celebrations); "India Aids U. S. 'Two Chinas' Plot," 27 ibid. 23 (July 3, 1964);
"What is the Sato Government up to in the U.N.?", 51 ibid. 6 (Dee. 18, 1964);
"Eisaku Sato's Daydream," 49 ibid. 30 (Dec. 4, 1964); "New Delhi's Attempt to
Create 'Two Chinas' Denounced," 47 ibid. 18 (Nov. 20, 1964) (India had invited
delegations from both "Chinas" to the 22nd International Geological Conference).
At a June 20, 1964, press conference, Foreign Minister Chen Yi declared:
"We are convinced that U. S. imperialism's manipulation of the United Nations
will sooner or later break down and the Chiang Kai-shek gang will sooner or later be
ousted from it. The lawful seat of the People's Republic of China in the United
Nations will sooner or later be restored. This, of course, takes time. We are not in
a hurry, we can wait. Under no circumstances will we barter away principles and
sovereignty; any attempt to make the restoration of China's seat in the United Nations
a bait for our acceptance of the 'two Chinas' scheme is doomed to failure." 26
ibid. 6, 7 (June 26, 1964); People's Daily, "China's Sovereignty Over Taiwan Brooks
No Intervention," May 12, 1964, 20 ibid. 6 (May 15, 1964); People's Daily, "On Es-
tablishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and France," Jan. 29, 1964,5
ibid. 10 (Jan. 31, 1964); Chou En-lai, Press Conference, Pahistan, Feb. 25, 1964, 10
ibid. 18 (March 6, 1964); Chou En-lai, interview with Bernard Tesselin, Feb. 3, 1964,
7 ibid. 14 (Feb. 14, 1964).
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